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ABSTRACT

The use of proactive tactics to disrupt criminal activities, such as
Terry street stops and concentrated misdemeanor arrests, are
essential to the “new policing.” This model applies complex metrics,
strong management, and aggressive enforcement and surveillance to
focus policing on high crime risk persons and places. The tactics
endemic to the “new policing” gave rise in the 1990s to popular, legal,
political, and social science concerns about disparate treatment of
minority groups in their everyday encounters with law enforcement.
Empirical evidence showed that minorities were indeed stopped and
arrested more frequently than similarly situated Whites, even when
controlling for local social and crime conditions. In this Article, we
examine racial disparities under a unique configuration of the street
stop prong of the “new policing”—the inclusion of non-contact
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observations (or surveillances) in the field interrogation and
observation activity of Boston Police Department officers. We show
that Boston Police officers focus significant portions of their field
investigation activity in two areas: suspected and actual gang
members, and the city’s high crime areas. Minority neighborhoods
experience higher levels of field interrogation and surveillance
activity, controlling for crime and other social factors. Relative to
White suspects, Black suspects are more likely to be observed,
interrogated, and frisked or searched controlling for gang
membership and prior arrest history. Moreover, relative to their
Black counterparts, White police officers conduct high numbers of
field investigations and are more likely to frisk or search subjects of
all races. We distinguish between preference-based and statistical
discrimination by comparing stops by officer-suspect racial pairs. If
officer activity is independent of officer race, we would infer that
disproportionate stops of minorities reflect statistical discrimination.
We show instead that officers seem more likely to investigate and
frisk or search a minority suspect if officer and suspect race differ.
We locate these results in the broader tensions of racial profiling that
pose recurring social and constitutional concerns in the “new
policing.”
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INTRODUCTION
A. The New Policing
In an essay published in 2000 in the Fordham Urban Law Journal,
Professor Philip Heymann credited the “new policing” for the sharp
crime declines of the preceding decade.1 Three essential features
characterized the “new policing.” First, police innovators developed
real-time policing metrics both for internal personnel management
and to inform how and where police are deployed across their
respective cities.2 They noted the importance of the strategic
concentration of police resources in the city’s highest crime areas
based on new methods of crime mapping and analysis.3 Second, these
metrics were used to hold local police commanders accountable for

1. See Phillip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 411,
413–14 (2000). A few years before, Professor Debra Livingston had summarized this
vector of tactics that comprised the “new policing” in a 1997 essay, but stopped short
of crediting the police for producing the crime decline across cities. Debra Livingston,

Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 672 (1997).
2. Heymann, supra note 1, at 429–32.
3. David Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve: Comp Stat and Strategic
Problem Solving in American Policing, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 421, 440–41
(2003) [hereinafter Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve]. For early experiments

on metrics-driven proactive policing, see generally Lawrence W. Sherman & David
Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995); Edward McGarrell et al.,
Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 119–148 (2001–02); David Weisburd et al., The Possible “Backfire”

Effects of Hot Spots Policing: An Experimental Assessment of Impacts on
Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 297

(2011).
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crime trends in their precincts.4 Failure to lower crime rates resulted
in a form of public shaming in meetings of high-level police
executives,
and
possibly
demotion
and
re-assignment.5
Accountability and heightened management control were essential
tools to incentivize commanders to closely watch and react to local
crime conditions.
The third new policing tool was the use of proactive tactics to
disrupt criminal activities. Aggressive street stops were one of the
tactics highlighted by both Livingston and Heymann.6 They and
others7 discussed the new police focus on order maintenance and the
aggressive enforcement of quality-of-life crimes,8 on the enforcement
of minor crimes as a way to suppress more serious crimes, on stop and
frisk tactics to disrupt crimes and especially to seize weapons, and on
new developments in community policing that brought police into
closer collaborative relationships with citizens.9
Decades earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had expanded the legal
boundaries under which police could conduct field interrogations, or
street stops, in a 1968 decision, Terry v. Ohio.10 Terry permitted
temporary stops and detentions based on reasonable suspicion that
crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more demanding probable cause
standard11 and memorializing police discretion as the gateway to

4. WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S
TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
5. JOHN F. TIMONEY, BEAT COP TO TOP COP: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 168–69
(2010).
6. Livingston, supra note 1, at 571.
7. See, e.g., GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS
(1996); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 31
JUST. Q. 633, 658–60 (2014); David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered:
Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 392–
94 (2004).
8. See supra note 7. The policy also focused intensively on misdemeanor drug
crimes, especially marijuana possession, as part of the “Broken Windows” strategy.
Part of the logic of such enforcement was also to find more serious criminal offenders
among those committing such minor crimes. See generally JACK MAPLE & CHRIS
MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: HOW YOU CAN MAKE YOUR CRIME FREE (2000).
Maple and Mitchell claimed that marijuana arrests would prevent more serious
crimes since marijuana smokers were criminals “on their day off.” Id. at 155.
9. See supra note 7.
10. 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (holding that “[t]he reasonableness of any particular
search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular
circumstances . . . [against the standard of whether] a man of reasonable caution is
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate.”); see also infra Part II
and accompanying notes.
11. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 366–67 (2003) (reaffirming the probable
cause standard under the Fourth Amendment to justify a “search and seizure”).
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street stops.12 Subsequent decisions further expanded the tolerances
around the concept of “reasonable suspicion.”13 The “new policing”
embraced the use of street stops as a critical tool to disrupt criminal
activity, despite the absence of any evidence of the comparative
advantage of street stops over other policing tactics.14
Proactivity was the animating theory of the “new policing,”
whether in the context of data-driven management metrics such as
CompStat,15 a computerized crime accounting system, the aggressive
use of arrests for minor crimes, or the conduct of street stops at the
first signs of suspicious behavior.16 In the current era, the term was
first used without fanfare by Professors Jerome Skolnick and David
Bayley in their description of policing innovations in the 1980s.17
New York City police first used proactive policies to disrupt open-air
drug markets starting in the early 1990s.18
Over time, proactivity became a broad umbrella for a wide range of
police tactics. One study defines “proactive policing” as the vigorous
enforcement of law against minor (misdemeanor) offenses.19 Other
studies mention the use of stop and frisk, or investigative stops, as
central to a proactive policing policy.20 Still others portray a curious
admixture of drug enforcement and community policing as

12. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
13. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
14. A decade later, the National Research Council policing panel conspicuously
avoided the question of what police should do once they got to the targeted places.
However, a recent systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of hot spots
policing on crime suggests that community problem-solving approaches generated
stronger crime reduction impacts relative to increased enforcement efforts. See Braga
et al., supra note 7, at 633.
15. Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve, supra note 3, at 424. Many police
departments adopted elements of the “new policing” without incorporating the
metrics-driven management algorithms for targeting and assessment of police actions.
In fact, the authors critique management metrics as retarding organization reform
and reinforcing the paramilitary model of police innovation. Id.
16. Id. at 427.
17. See generally JEROME SKOLNICK & DAVID BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE:
POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES (1986) (discussing a shift in police
tactics from being reactive to crime complaints toward acting in response to chronic
criminal problems in specific places).
18. Lynn Zimmer, Proactive Policing Against Street-Level Drug Trafficking, 9
AM. J. POL’Y 43, 52–55 (1990).
19. Charis Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities,
48 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 57 (2010).
20. JEFFREY FAGAN ET AL., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The
Logic and Demography of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309 (Stephen Rice & Michael White eds., 2010).
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“proactive.”21 Accordingly, there is no consensus on what constitutes
“proactive policing” other than its emphasis on anticipation of
criminal activity and directing action to those places or persons, and
its commitment to systematic criminal enforcement of minor crimes.22
Tactics such as investigative stops (stop and frisk, or Terry stops),
order maintenance and aggressive responses to quality of life
enforcement, the same tactics cited by Livingston, are basic to many
conceptions of proactive policing, and are the focus of this Article.23
B. Policing Crime, Policing Race
The metrics of the “new policing” pointed to the neighborhoods
with the highest crime rates as the targets of police activity. These
usually were the places with concentrated poverty and often were
minority neighborhoods.24 At first glance, this seems a rational and
proportional response, consistent with most benchmarking strategies
to assess fairness or bias.25 Yet, regardless of the distribution and
allocation function to assign police to neighborhoods—a linear
allocation of police to neighborhoods based on differences in their
crime rates, for example—disproportionate allocations raise both
21. Jon Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 318

(2004).
22. The original “broken windows” essay, whose ideas informed much of the next
decade of proactive policing, suggested that arrest was a last resort if other efforts
failed to ameliorate the disorderly conditions that invited crime. See George L.
Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC (March 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/LW3A-6JHA]. By 2000, Kelling had
embraced the notion of using arrest authority systematically and aggressively to stop
minor crime from growing into more serious crime patterns and problems. See
KELLING & COLES, supra note 7, at 108–156.
23. Livingston, supra note 1, at 554–58.
24. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 462 (2000); see
Lauren J. Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial Structure, and Neighborhood Violent
Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1765–1802 (2009); see also ROBERT SAMPSON &
JEFFREY MORENOFF, DURABLE INEQUALITY: SPATIAL DYNAMICS, SOCIAL PROCESSES
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS 176 (Samuel
Bowles et al. eds., 2006).
25. See Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially
Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL
READINGS 180 (Stephen Rice & Michael White eds., 2010); Jeffrey Fagan, Law,
Social Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. AND POL’Y 104 (2002); Ian Ayres,
Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 J. JUST. RES. & STAT. ASS’N
131 (2002); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth
Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2004).
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fairness and efficiency questions.26 In such instances, minority
citizens are exposed to “more” policing than their crime conditions
would dictate, and persons in other neighborhoods placed at risk due
to under- or de-policing of their neighborhoods.27
Assuming limits on the effectiveness of police in an area—after all,
there is only so much crime to go around—then over-policing risks
adverse consequences from unnecessary and unproductive police
contacts.28 And since these stops are neither pleasant nor without
consequences,29 allocations framed this way raise constitutional
questions of disparate treatment.30 The persistence of these errors in
the context of the extensive use of noxious tactics suggests that these
practices and disparities took on the characteristics of a government
program rather than the exercise of individual officers’ judgment and
discretion.31
Court rulings often skirt the question of whether bias is the
dynamic that produces disparities, preferring instead to examine
discriminatory intent.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause forbids state actors from denying the equal
protection of the law.32 Intentional discrimination by race is the
standard, not simply whether a policy or practice has a
disproportionate racial impact.33 Whether that intent is a matter of
bias or preferences is not central to a legal determination. Intent,
instead, is the predicate to determine discrimination. Courts have
developed standards to establish discriminatory intent that would

26.
27.
28.
29.

See supra note 25.
See id.
See id.
See Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Street Stops and
Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization,

11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 758 (2014); Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan & Tom
R. Tyler, Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 2121, 2121 (2014).
30. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see
also Jeffrey Fagan, Greg Conyers & Ian Ayres, No Runs, Few Hits and Many Errors:
Street Stops, Bias and Proactive Policing (2014) (unpublished conference draft) (on
file with author).
31. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN
TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006); David
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters,
84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1999); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors:
Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2015).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976).
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satisfy an equal protection claim, such as intentionally classifying
persons by race for differential treatment.34 The standard most
applicable for contemporary policing is an “as applied”
determination: that a seemingly neutral policy is applied in an
intentionally discriminatory manner.35 Courts have argued that an
equal protection claim is satisfied by evidence of a discriminatory
“purpose” as a “motivating factor” for the practice under scrutiny.36
The question of bias is secondary to the question of the complex task
of discerning discriminatory intent. In the case of a widespread
program37 of Terry or street stops, an intentionally disproportionate
application of the stop authority to persons of one race—with perhaps
deliberate indifference to these patterns—raises the specter of
intent.38
Still, there remain several empirical challenges to detecting bias in
the institutional practices of law enforcement agencies and in the
actions of individual police officers. Control groups, benchmarks to
assess proportionality, endogeneity of crime and policing, varying
spatial boundaries, individual biases versus institutional practices,
police-citizen interpersonal interactions, characteristics of officers and
the composition of both the civilian and police populations, multiple
outcomes of stops and processes within stops, and several important
contextual factors all contribute to the challenges facing researchers.
All these parameters are basic to design decisions in assessing the
extent of police discrimination. We address these challenges in the
empirical project reported in this Article.

34. See, e.g., Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000) (permitting a
racial classification for police only when police are pursuing a person meeting a
specific suspect description). Normally, all such classifications are evaluated at the
highest standard of “strict scrutiny.” See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499,
505 (2005) (holding that “all racial classification” imposed by government “must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Brown, 221 F. 3d at 337; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373–74 (1886).
36. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265–66 (1977) (“Because discriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct
proof, litigants may make “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action—whether it
bears more heavily on one race than another—may provide an important starting
point.”).
37. Meares, supra note 31, at 164–65.
38. Id.
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C. Stops and Stares: The Surveillance Prong of the “New Policing”
In this Article, we examine the extent of racial disparities under a
unique configuration of the street stop prong of the “new policing”—
the use of Field Interrogation, Observation, Frisk and/or Search
(BPD form 2487; hereafter, FIO) reports by the Boston Police
Department (BPD). As in many other big cities, the Boston FIO
strategy included the basic element of investigative stops or field
interrogations as a staple of its proactive tactics.
Beyond this core tactic, however, two additional components
distinguish the Boston design from most forms of the “new policing.”
First, Boston officers conduct non-contact observations of known
criminal offenders or others gathering in known crime locations.
Officers are required to complete FIO reports for both in-person
encounters and non-contact observations. Officers are required to
enter the information from non-contact observations or surveillance
in the same databases that house data from field interrogations (or
investigative stops).39 Department policy requires that observations
be more than a stakeout or a hunch. That is, the observation must be
specific to a suspected crime, rather than general surveillance of
individuals.40
Second, the policy explicitly recognizes the role of surveillance and
intelligence-gathering in the local strategy.41 Surveillance of known
offenders, their associates, and their gathering places “plays an
important part in the department’s intelligence efforts to collect and
disseminate data on the activities and whereabouts of known and
suspected criminals and their associates in the city.”42 In effect, the
strategy allows the department to build a network database of the
movements and associations of individuals through time and space in

39. See, e.g., Bos. Police Dep’t, Special Order SO 05-023, June 3, 2005, § 1 (“An
officer should . . . complete an FIOFS report whenever (a) he/she observes an
individual who [sic] the officer knows to have a criminal record.”).
40. Id. at § 4 (noting that “[a]n officer shall complete an FIOFS report whenever:
(a) he/she observes, detains, or interrogates a person suspected of unlawful
design . . . . The officer must enter the type of crime suspected . . . . [I]t is not
sufficient to simply enter ‘suspicious person’ or ‘SP.’”); see also Bos. Police Dep’t,
Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 5 (March 9, 2011).
41. Special Order SO-5-023, at § 1(stating that “[t]he FIOFS report has been
prepared so that the department may accumulate up-to-date information concerning
known criminals and their associates, the vehicles they use, the places they frequent,
and persons suspected of unlawful design”).
42. Id. at General Considerations.
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the city. The observations also are considered documentary evidence
and therefore admissible if relevant in any future proceedings.43
Few police departments have acknowledged the potential for
intelligence-gathering that is created from Terry stops, much less how
the data could be aggregated and analyzed for that purpose. Even
fewer acknowledge the Fourth Amendment implications on privacy
and anonymity.44 While intelligence-gathering is not unusual in
policing in response to known crime groups such as street gangs or
drug selling organizations,45 the transformation of Terry stops into an
intelligence regime seems new. While surveillance of individuals or
gangs is permissible, surveillance without a warrant for places and
persons wandering through them raises constitutional concerns.46
Pretextual stops made on thin grounds for reasonable suspicion can
create opportunities to record time-place-network activities of
suspected offenders or other valued targets such as gang members or
drug traffickers. Surveillance without contact is another matter.47
Recorded observations by officers who have knowledge of the
identity and affiliations of that target can in effect double down on
the information gathered through in-person contacts.48 These noncontact observations can in fact lead to further contacts, assuming
43. Bos. Police Dep’t, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 2.
44. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 79 (2007) (discussing the elasticity of
the reasonable suspicion prong of Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate
contemporary surveillance practices by police of gang members and others suspected
of potential criminal participation).
45. See William Bloss, Escalating U.S. Surveillance After 9/11: An Examination
of Causes and Effects, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 208 (2002) (documenting the
expansion of police surveillance in response to perceived threats from crime, drug
selling and national security concerns); see also Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering,
the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, 199 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 144 (1999)
(expressing concern that granting police authority to focus on public spaces can
evolve into policing as an instrument for surveillance and harassment of “disfavored”
individuals or groups).
46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (finding that there is no
Fourth Amendment violation when evidence is obtained without “physical entrance
into the area”); Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). But
see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (holding that the use of a
thermal imaging device from a public position to monitor the radiation of heat from a
person’s home was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus required a
warrant).
47. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the War on
Drugs, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Following
the Script, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (2015).
48. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 47; Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra
note 47.
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usable intelligence that can be linked to specific persons or groups.49
For example, the U.S. Customs Service, under former NYPD
Commissioner Raymond Kelly, used “intelligence developed by
another officer” to target persons for later administrative searches.50
The observational or intelligence components of the “new
policing” have received little attention in either legal or empirical
scholarship on policing, or on the constitutional implications of these
types of “passive” stops. Certainly, there are Fourth Amendment
implications when police use prior suspicionless observations as a
partial basis for a later interdiction that risks arrest and its
aftermath.51 Chicago’s constitutional troubles in the 1990s with its
gang loitering ordinance show the difficult line that police face when
determining when to escalate observation of non-criminal conduct
such as loitering into reasonable suspicion of a crime that would
justify a coercive stop.52 If there is no notice to citizens about what
conduct might authorize police attention, it may be equally unclear to
the police.
There also are distinct Equal Protection implications when
individuals are disproportionately targeted by race for observations
that can lead to more intrusive or coercive police actions in the short
term.53 Racial disparities in this passive component of the new
policing would be compounded in subsequent police contacts, given
the leveraging of intelligence into further stop activity.54 The deeper
49. Because there is no seizure of the subject, Terry’s ground rules for street
detentions may not be applicable to non-contact observations. Yet observations can
be bootstrapped by police officers into information that can serve as the basis for the
reasonable suspicion that Terry requires. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968).
50. Jerome Skolnick & Abigail Caplovits, Guns, Drugs and Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 413, 433–34 (2001) (citing UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BETTER TARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD
PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS, GAO/GGD-00-38, 87, at 5–6, 16 (2000)).
51. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011). Cruz was
ordered to exit a vehicle when police officers spotted it parked next to a fire hydrant
and then smelled marijuana smoke. Possession of small amounts of marijuana had
been decriminalized in Massachusetts since 2008. Cruz had fallen under the police
gaze in this instance because of his prior encounters with police, and those encounters
heightened their suspicion leading to the search of the vehicle for what amounts to a
civil infraction. See also David Keenan & Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity
Model for Stop and Frisks, 123 YALE L.J. 1448, 1458–60 (2014).
52. Chicago v. Morales, 521 U.S 41, 55–57 (1999) (holding that a gang loitering
ordinance is vague as to what behaviors would be actionable for police and therefore
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); see Livingston, Gang
Loitering, supra note 45, at 163 and accompanying text.
53. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science, and Racial Profiling, supra note 25, at
106–08.
54. See, e.g., id. at 111–12.

550

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

(though not wider)55 pool of information may well increase the odds
of an in-person contact, raising additional questions about disparities
and the potential for a constitutional claim.
Surveillance is fundamental to the street stop component of the
“new policing.”
The sequence of interactions leading to an
investigative stop, or a contact stop, often include a period of
observation of a suspect before an officer decides if there is sufficient
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to proceed to contact and
interaction with the suspect.56 In most places, these predicate
observations are not recorded if the surveillance does not convert to a
contact stop; only those observations that trigger actions are included
in databases.57 This is what sets the Boston FIO regime apart from
other forms of the new policing: its expansion under Fourth
Amendment ground rules to include surveillance of the type that
normally is reserved for national security concerns or complex
criminal organizations.58 Here, the everyday movements of persons
fall under the police gaze and are memorialized in databases.
Whether these observations are contributory to disparate treatment
under the Equal Protection clause on their own or in conjunction with
direct contacts is the focus of this Article.
D. This Article
Empirical tests for Equal Protection violations in policing have
become more common and urgent as political and legal challenges to
the “new policing” have grown.59 Research to date on vehicle and

55. The pool is deeper in the sense that more information is gathered about the
same person or persons over time. But if an area or group is targeted, the
information is narrowly focused on one person or one social network or one or more
groups of persons moving through a targeted space. While Illinois v. Wardlow
requires presence in a high crime area as a component of suspicion, passive stops
based on presence in a high crime area de-temporize that presence and disconnect it
from other indicia of suspicion that are present at the time of the street stop. See
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
56. See Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra note 47, at 63.
57. See, e.g., N.Y. Police Dep’t, The Spot, Frisk, and Question Database (2003–
2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_
and_frisk_report.shtml [https://perma.cc/9A8T-FNS6]. The databases include only
in-person stops or field interrogations. For each stop, the period of observation
preceding the stop is also recorded. Nearly all of the observation periods are less
than two minutes. Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra note 47, at 63.
58. See Bos. Police Dep’t, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 1; see, e.g., Daniel
Richman, The Right Fight, BOS. REV. (Dec. 1, 2004), https://bostonreview.net/forum/
right-fight [https://perma.cc/7MDP-NL7B].
59. Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical
Challenges 3 (U Mich. L. & Econ., Res. Paper No. 15-003, 2015).
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highway stops raises difficult questions as to the construction and
vetting of claims of racial discrimination. 60 These difficulties have
been compounded and perhaps have become more complex with the
increased attention to policing inequalities by the U.S. Department of
Justice61 and civil litigation on a variety of statutory and constitutional
grounds.62 These cases have generated new databases and competing
analytic strategies to identify the causal role of race in the observed
disparities in policing. In this Article, we examine the role of race in
explaining how pre-arrest coercive policing and passive surveillancebased policing are carried out in an urban setting of complex and
varied crime problems.
The addition of passive or surveillance-based policing models
expands the underlying normative tensions in policing by placing
citizens under the police gaze in a setting more closely approximating
a panopticonistic vision of policing.63 Police surveillance of organized
crime groups and political dissidents has a long history, with court
interventions that established procedural and substantive boundaries
on these activities.64 Incorporating surveillance into a prophylactic
Terry regime, whether for street gangs or other loosely organized
offender networks or for everyday criminal or delinquent activity,
merges acute public safety and national security concerns into
everyday policing.65 This spillover from national security to the “new
policing,” raises important questions about how the equal protection
doctrine applies. The further dimension of racial disparity that seems

60. Id. at 34–36.
61. See Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, (2009) (discussing the limitations of “retail” litigation
under §1983 and other individual cases to produce institutional reform in policing
and arguing for the stronger, institutionally-focused mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 14141
to produce meaningful institutional changes).
62. See Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014)
(showing results of litigation under Monell liability claims for police misconduct).
63. See William Simon, In Defense of the Panopticon (Colum. Pub. L., Res. Paper
No. 14-412, 2014) (arguing for the social welfare and regulatory benefits of neutral
broad surveillance including the police as governmental actors); see also Peter K.
Manning, A View of Surveillance, in TECHNOCRIME: TECHNOLOGY, CRIME AND
SOCIAL CONTROL, 209–42 (2008). See generally Larry Catá Backer, Global

Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of Monitoring
Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 112 (2008) (tracing the modern

decentralized and globalized surveillance state).
64. See Benjamin S. Mishkin, Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local
Intelligence Oversight, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1414, 1427 n.78 (2013).
65. See id.; see also, Richman, supra note 58.
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inherent in street stop regimes, deepens the stakes in this analysis of
the “new policing” by linking race and national security rationales.66
The Article unfolds in the following five parts. Part I provides
background on the transformation of police and the emergence of
proactive policing since Terry. Despite the efforts of the Terry court
to scrub race from its analysis of the original Terry stop, the role of
race in the jurisprudence of Terry stops has become clearer over time,
leading to the important cases today that closely connect Terry, race
and proactive policing. We trace the political and normative conflicts
over racial profiling into the courts, and also into the sociological
analysis of race and policing. We draw a distinction between
discrimination and bias, and show the divide in empirical strategies to
test the two explanations of observed racial disparities.
Part II describes in detail the research site, and the integration of
surveillance into the regime of proactive policing in Boston. Part III
discusses the research strategy to identify the role of race in
producing the patterns of policing that we observe in Boston. We
weigh alternatives facing empirical researchers in measurement and
analysis of these data and explain the methodological choices that we
made. We distinguish the role of race in surveillance versus in-person
encounters. We discuss the use of officer race as a metric to identify
the extent of racial preferences among officers. We also discuss
modeling choices for data where policing is spatially disaggregated
across parts of the city that vary extensively in their social and crime
condition.
Part IV presents the empirical results. We show that contact stops
and non-contact observations of Black suspects are more common
than for White suspects after controlling for local crime and social
conditions in Boston neighborhoods. The patterns are robust to
several alternate empirical specifications. The local emphasis on
surveillance and interdiction of gang members explains some but not
all of the racial disparities in the conduct of FIOs; these disparities are
present across most tactical units and locales in the BPD. Diversity in
policing matters in these estimates: Black officers appear to be less
active in FIO reporting than their White colleagues, both in general
patrol activities as well as in the specialized gang enforcement units.
They make fewer stops of Black suspects and search Black suspects
less often. The results suggest that Black and Hispanic officers seem
to act with statistical discrimination whereas White officers seem to
66. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice
Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 356 (2013)
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act based on preferences for discrimination that are present beyond
what statistical discrimination would suggest. We show continuity in
racial disparities in police contacts from the general Terry regime of
street stops to the expanded surveillance activities, indicative of the
broader expansion of Terry doctrine over the past half century.
We conclude with a discussion of two intersecting implications of
this case study: efficiency and fairness. As a preliminary question, we
assess the adequacy and probative value of this empirical strategy to
detect equal protection violations in the conduct of stops coupled
with a more arms-length program of surveillance. The new policing
inevitably will produce racially disparate impacts, given crime
patterns and the actuarialism that is baked into its strategy and logic.
Its expansion to surveillance, which sidesteps Terry’s rules, raises new
questions about the constitutional regulation of the “new policing.”
The devolution of Terry to a program of both surveillance and
administrative stops raises important questions for the regulation of
this activity and more broadly for the governance of police with
respect both to privacy considerations and for its racial dimensions.67
I. TERRY STOPS, RACE, AND THE NEW POLICING
A. Expansion and Deregulation of Investigative Stops
In Terry v Ohio,68 the Supreme Court granted police broad
authority to conduct investigative stops when they have reasonable
and particularized suspicion to believe that crime is imminent, in
progress, or has just occurred.69 The issues of race that were minor
features of the original Terry case became explicit concerns over the
next several decades in the law, politics, and policy of policing.70

67. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272–73 (1999).
68. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. Id. at 30 (holding that officers could temporarily detain and question a suspect
when they had reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that crime was
“afoot”).
70. See generally R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the
War on Drugs, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston,
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2002); see also Kevin R.
Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003
Guidelines, 25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 85 (2004); Bernard Harcourt, Against
Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, (Univ. Chi. Pub.
L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 94, 2005). See generally Andrew Taslitz,
Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. CRIM.
L. 1 (2007).
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The Violent Crime Control Act of 1994 anticipated the racial
disproportionalities in the new policing.71 Congress included a
provision that allowed the U.S. Department of Justice to sue local law
enforcement agencies when it observes a pattern or practice of
systemic violations of people’s rights.72 Litigation under “Section
14141” beginning in the 1990s identified both Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations in racial profiling, leading to court supervision
of both state and local police agencies.73 Consent decrees were
approved by federal district courts in three jurisdictions in the 1990s,74
imposing obligations on local police departments to reform policy and
practice to remedy constitutional violations including race
discrimination in both stops and the use of force.75
The first consent decrees focused on police use of force in
Pittsburgh and Stubenville, Ohio.76 The first consent decree alleging
racial profiling in a state police agency was formalized in late 1999 in
New Jersey, citing constitutional violations in the selection of
motorists for stops and searches on the New Jersey Turnpike.77
Consent decrees in Maryland, New Jersey, and Los Angeles soon
followed, each adding to a foundation of empirical evidence of
racially selective police enforcement.78 A 1999 investigation by the
71.Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, 108
Stat 1796 (1994).
72. Id. at § 210401. Section 210401, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14141, provides, in
part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof,
or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
73. See Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10, 12–13 (2009).
74. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An
Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 817, 817, 818 n.4 (1999).
75. See Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-enforcement-agencies
[https://perma.cc/2V5U-25EH].
76. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 142–43 (1998) (discussing the first
wave of consent decrees).
77. See generally United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999),
http://www.nj.gov/lps/jointapp.htm [https://perma.cc/5LYC-S2KV].
78. See Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform, Bargaining and
Police Regulation by Data Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 94, 95 n.6
(2012); see also CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER 52 (2014). See generally IAN
AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., A STUDY OF
RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
(2008); Banks, supra note 70; Fagan & Davies, supra note 24; Joanna Schwartz,

Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role Of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement
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New York State Attorney General cited both Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations by the New York City Police Department in
its conduct of Terry stops under its “stop and frisk” regime and a
Stipulated Settlement in New York City.79 In 2001, the Los Angeles
Police Department finalized a consent decree80 to remedy a pattern of
“false arrests, using excessive force, conducting stops without
reasonable suspicion, and . . . improper searches and seizures.”81
Between 2002 and 2014, consent decrees were implemented in fifteen
cities across the country, revealing a set of systemic concerns about
both the Fourth Amendment core of Terry and the more hidden
Fourteenth Amendment prong.82
Controversies over the racial prong of Terry’s “reasonable
suspicion” standard arose shortly after Terry in a case where the
Supreme Court justified the use of Mexican or Latino ethnicity to
sanction police stop authority near the U.S.-Mexico border.83 That
case, in conjunction with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,84 a case
decided a year earlier, are the only U.S. Supreme Court cases to
specifically sanction the use of race or ethnicity in the decision to stop
an individual under the Fourth Amendment rules stated in Terry.85 A
similar logic of profiling based on race and ethnicity was internalized
in the early 1980s in drug enforcement training that led to racial
disproportionality in highway stops.86

Decisionmaking, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Harcourt, supra note 70; Harris,
supra note 31.
79. Eliot Spitzer, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK”
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 148–49, 160–62 (1999); Andrew Gelman,
Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 107 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 813, 813 (2007). Those violations persisted through the Daniels stipulated
settlement and up to Floyd verdict and order in 2013. See Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
80. United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 GAF (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001),
http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5YD-7CJ8].
81. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant, Att’y Gen., to James K. Hahn,
City Attorney, City of Los Angeles (May 8, 2000) (notice of investigation letter to the
Los Angeles Police Department), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
lapdnoti.php [https://perma.cc/N4EB-VE9K].
82. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, supra note 75.
83. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
84. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
85. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–86.
86. See Harris, supra note 31, at 278–79; see also Gross & Livingston, supra note
70, at 1431.
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In 1996, the Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual rationales
motivating automobile stops in Whren v. United States.87 While not
explicitly a rationale for the use of race in selective enforcement, the
Court refused to consider any factors other than objective
considerations that animated the officer’s actions.88 In other words,
having satisfied probable cause requirements under the Fourth
Amendment, a search motivated by race would not pose a
constitutional violation.89 Whren effectively separated Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection considerations from Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches,90 a
separation that was repaired in Floyd v. City of New York in 2013.91
While maintaining its ban on the explicit use of race as an objective
factor to justify stops, the Supreme Court expanded its analysis of
race and policing in Illinois v. Wardlow to permit police stops based
in part on robust correlates of race. 92 The Court noted that, although
an individual’s presence in a “high crime area” does not meet the
standard for a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a location’s
characteristics are relevant to determining whether a behavior is
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.93 But the
Wardlow court offered little guidance to police and courts to define a
87. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138
(1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s
action does not invalidate that action . . . . ”)).
88. Id. In the same paragraph, the Whren Court says that previous holdings show
that the only time when an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable
behavior, including searches, is in the context of an inventory or administrative
search.
89. Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains
the Same, in RACE AND LAW STORIES 419, 435 (Devon Carbado & Rachel F. Moran
eds., 2006).
90. See id; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte: The Road to Racial Profiling, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 315 (C. Steiker ed., 2006).
91. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
that “McDonald was stopped, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, because he was a black man crossing the street late at night in
Queens”).
92. See Illinois v Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in
an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. But
officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation.”).
93. Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972))
(“Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high
crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”).
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“high crime area,” in terms of its boundaries, crime levels, duration of
crime, type of crime, or whether the standard varies across cities or
parts of the country.94 In effect, the standard was subjective and in
turn, beyond regulation.95 The Wardlow court left it up to the
judgment not just of police officials but also of the individual officer
to determine whether the location where she encountered a person
whose behavior attracts her gaze meets the definition of “high crime
area.”96 While celebrating local knowledge, much the same as the
Terry court celebrated Officer McFadden’s local knowledge and
experience, the Court also complicated the design of standards that
could be applied to audit and regulate its application.97 In other
words, Wardlow created a vague and subjective standard that would
be difficult to regulate either institutionally or by courts. Since “high
crime areas” and social disadvantage often are conflated both
perceptually and statistically with concentrations of minority
citizens,98 this logic places minority neighborhoods at risk for
elevating the suspiciousness of their residents in the eyes of the
police.
94. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson et al., The “High-Crime Area” Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605 (2008).
95. See id. at 1593, 1642.
96. See Wardlow, 528 U.S at 124 (holding that “officers are not required to ignore

the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances
are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have
previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”).
97. See id. at 124 (“In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion,
but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized
that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.”); see also Ferguson et al., supra note 94, at 1594 (“After the Supreme
Court’s decision . . . , the totality-of-the-circumstances test has devolved into a test
that is met with two factors: high-crime area and unprovoked flight from police.”).
98. See generally GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL EQUALITY (2002);
DOUGLAS MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM (2007); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Robert J. Sampson &
Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New
Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 609–20, 622–30
(1999); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 320–21 (2004); Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects:
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987–88 (1999); Jeffrey
Fagan, Crime and Neighborhood Change, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME TRENDS 81 (A.
Goldberger & R. Rosenfeld eds., 2008); Geoffrey Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 411–13
(2005).
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B. Normative Tensions
The basis for targeted enforcement was an instrumental analysis of
profiling as a tradeoff of harms that leads to a moral imperative to
create wide space for police to act on race-based signals of
suspicion.99 Proponents of race-based selection of suspects, or
racially disproportionate selection, based their preferences on three
prongs: (a) higher crime rates among African American and Latino
people (or in places where they are demographically concentrated),
(b) the greater efficiency and effectiveness of police methods that
apply race-based strategies, and (c) the moral imperative to pursue
tactics that maximize social welfare and security.100 To ignore race in
the design of police tactics would be to risk greater exposure of
individuals, including those in the affected groups, to unjustified
harms.101 These utilitarian arguments for profiling assume that the
social good produced by welfare outweighs the harms of the
inequalities inherent in race-based selection of persons.102
The arguments advancing profiling ran headlong into its
constitutional weaknesses, even under a newly capacious Fourth
Amendment suspicion standard that invited the substitution of racebased correlates of suspicion for explicit racial categories.103 The

99. See Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 131, 131–35 (2004).
100. See id. at 135, 141–42, 151 (2004). But see Annabelle Lever, Why Racial
Profiling is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 94, 109 (2005) (“[R]acial profiling will likely exacerbate the racism of a racist
society and, at all events, will place particularly onerous burdens on those who are
already burdened by racism. In short, the dangers of compounding injustices that
are, already, grave and persistent, means that more is required by way of evidence
and argument to justify racial profiling than to oppose it); Steven N. Durlauf, Racial
Profiling as a Public Policy Question: Efficiency, Equity, and Ambiguity, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 132, 135(2005) (“First, . . . the current evidence on profiling and guilt
rates does not represent the basis for a justification of current racial profiling
practices. The effects of profiling on the crime rate are ambiguous, whereas there is a
clear fairness violation involved. Second, there should exist a presumption against
profiling policies which places the burden of proof on advocates of profiling to
demonstrate that the efficiency effects are sufficient to overcome the fairness
violation.”).
101. Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 99, at 135.
102. A similar argument was made by Sunstein and Vermeule on capital
punishment. They argued that if the death penalty was an effective deterrent to
murder, then the life-life tradeoff of capital punishment created a more imperative to
execute those convicted of capital murder, and a moral offense when executions are
not carried out in the face of evidence of deterrence and the possibility of lives lost.
See generally Cass Sunstein & Adrien Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005).
103. See Whren and Wardlow discussions, supra Part I.A.
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inherent constitutional violations deflated the moral arguments, as
did the dubious claim of its effectiveness. But other critiques
emerged that also pushed back on profiling.104 Beyond the failure of
proponents to find empirical support for the claim of its benefits, the
utilitarian view tended to discount the serious harms to the innocent
who are stopped, particularly innocent African Americans who bore
the brunt of police actions.105
Recognition of those harms was inherent in the Terry decision
itself, which acknowledged that police stops, especially for the
innocent, amounted to more than a “petty indignity.”106 The harms
of Terry stops are several: the stigma harm of being singled out when
innocent, the shaming of being singled out by the police and
physically interrogated in front of one’s family and neighbors, the
racial stigma that attaches when minorities are disproportionately
targeted for stops, and the potential for physical violence when stops
arouse anger or when police use aggressiveness when confronted by
their own safety fears.107 Stops can be verbally harsh, physically
aggressive, or laced with racial or sexual invectives that trigger a
variety of emotional reactions.108
Accordingly, a robust and
consistent stream of research reveals numerous harms that people of
color experience as a result of accumulated, proactive police contacts.
Survey research in New York City under its stop and frisk program
showed elevated rates of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
among the young adults most often stopped and most intrusively
policed.109

104. See generally Lever, supra note 100; see also Durlauf, Racial Profiling as a
Public Policy Question, supra note 100.
105. Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 ECON. J. 402, 420 (2006)

(arguing that a Fairness Presumption would negate arguments for using race-based
police stops as a public policy and practice).
106. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968). “Moreover, it is simply fantastic
to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen
stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It is
a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Id.
107. William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1218
(1998); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the

Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling
More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1322 n.18 (2004). See generally Sherry F.
Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1456 (1996); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment:
Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 10 (2010).
108. See Stuntz, supra note 107.
109. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young
Urban Men, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2326 (2014).
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At the same time, a different form of equal protection complaints
remained generally unheard and has only recently been taken
seriously. Minority citizen concerns about the everyday underpolicing of distressed neighborhoods also have received less scholarly
attention.110 Nonetheless, police executives have increasingly come to
understand that disadvantaged, high-crime minority communities may
indeed simultaneously experience under- and over-policing.111
Professor Randall Kennedy notes that “in terms of misery inflicted by
direct criminal violence, blacks (and other people of color) suffer
more from the criminal acts of their racial ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ than
they do from the racist misconduct of White police officers.”112 Given
that both under- and over-policing have been shown to seriously
undermine public confidence in and trust of the police, policy makers
face a weighty challenge concerning how best to deliver effective
crime control strategies without engaging in potentially racially
discriminatory policing practices.113
C. Is It Bias? Approaches to Studying Police Stops and Searches
Recent empirical evidence on police stops supports perceptions
among minority citizens that police disproportionately stop African
American and Hispanic motorists, and that once stopped, these
citizens are more likely to be searched or arrested.114 For example,
surveys with nationwide probability samples, completed in 1999, 2002,
and 2008 showed that African-Americans were far more likely than
other Americans to report being stopped on the highways by
police.115 Each survey showed that minority drivers also were more

110. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998).
111. See id.; see also, David C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on
Crime Rates in Large U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST.1 (2017).
112. KENNEDY, supra note 110, at 20.
113. See id.
114. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch,
RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006); see also
MATTHEW H. ZINGRAFF ET AL., EVALUATING NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY
PATROL DATA: CITATIONS, WARNINGS, AND SEARCHES IN 1998 2 (2000); Harris,
supra note 31, at 265–326; Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work:
Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 653, 660
(2002); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy, Compliance and Cooperation:
Procedural Justice and Citizen Ties to the Law, 6 OHIO ST J. CRIM. L. 231–75 (2008).
115. PATRICK LANGAN LAWRENCE ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (2001); MATTHEW. R.
DUROSE, ERICA L. SCHMITT & PATRICK A. LANGAN, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE
AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY iv (2005); CHRISTINE
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likely to report being arrested, handcuffed, or searched by police, and
that they more often were threatened with force or had force used
against them.
Traffic violations also serve as the rationale or pretext for stops of
motorists,116 just as “suspicious behavior” is the spark for both
pedestrian and traffic stops.117 As with traffic violations, the range of
suspicious behaviors is broad enough to challenge efforts to identify
an appropriate baseline to which to compare race-specific stop
rates.118 Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing, used to
enforce narcotics and weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other
persons for whom warrants may be outstanding, to investigate
reported crimes and “suspicious” behavior, and to improve
community quality of life.119 Indeed, because low-level “quality of
life” and misdemeanor offenses are more likely to be committed in
the open, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is more easily satisfied
in these sorts of crimes.120
Two distinct approaches characterize recent efforts to model and
understand racial disparities in police stops.121 Each focuses less on
identifying racial bias than on understanding the role of race in
explaining patterns of police behavior.122 Attributing bias is difficult:
causal claims about discrimination would require far more
information than the typical administrative (observational) datasets

EITH & MATTHEW. R. DUROSE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC:
FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (2011).
116. Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: Problems with Police Traffic
Stop Data and an Early Warning System Solution, 3 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 63, 64
(2001); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK 30–33 (2002) (“[T]raffic stops offer a convenient way for police officers to
sidestep restrictions on whom they may detain and serve as a powerful tool for
putting criminal profiling into action.”).
117. See Alpert et al., supra note 98; see also AYRES & BOROWSKY, supra note 78,
at 4.
118. Joel Miller, Profiling Populations Available for Stops and Searches, in POLICE
RESEARCH SERIES PAPER 131, at 83 (Home Office Research, Dev. & Statistics
Directorate, 2000), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080305145815/http://
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs131.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3VT-LFDW];
Michael Smith & Geoffrey Alpert, Searching for Direction: Courts, Social Science,
and the Adjudication of Racial Profiling Claims, 19 JUST. Q. 673, 673–704 (2002). See
generally Jon Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, supra note 21.
119. Miller, supra note 118, at 10.
120. David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 333
(2001); David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases To Reform Racially Biased
Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 108–09 (2007).
121. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 309, 315.
122. Id.
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can supply. For example, when Officer McFadden stopped suspect
John Terry, he used his law enforcement “experience” to interpret
Terry’s behavior in front of the jewelry store.123 The multiplicity of
interacting factors complicated the identification of the role of race in
the decision to detain Terry,124 but several analyses of the facts and
jurisprudence of Terry suggest that the Supreme Court opinion
discounted the influence of race in the opinion.125
In Terry, it would be difficult to identify race alone, apart from the
context in which race was observed, as the factor that animated
McFadden’s decision to stop and frisk suspect Terry.126 Instead,
reliable evidence of ethnic or racial bias in these instances would
require experimental designs that control for these competing and
interacting factors—situational context, demeanor of suspect—so as
to isolate differences in outcomes that could only be attributed to race
or ethnicity. Such experiments are routinely used in tests of
discrimination in housing and employment.127 But observational
studies that lack such controls are often embarrassed by omitted
variable biases: few studies can control for all the variables that police
consider in deciding whether to stop or search someone, much less
their several combinations or permutations. Research in situ that
relies on direct observation of police behavior requires officers to
articulate the reasons for their actions, a task that is vulnerable to
numerous validity threats.128 Sampling considerations, as well as the
presence of researchers in the context of the decision, also challenge
the validity of observational studies.

123. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 33 (1968) (noting that “[i]t would have been
poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ experience in the detection of
thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this
behavior” and that Officer McFadden “had observed circumstances that would
reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about
to engage in burglary or robbery.”).
124. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997).
125. Thompson, supra note 98, at 964 (“The Court’s legal analysis was almost
entirely devoid of references to race.”); Rudovsky, supra note 120, at 109; see also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 832 (1999). See generally
Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946
(2002); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259 (2000).
126. Thompson, supra note 98, at 964.
127. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION 90 (2007); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108
AM. J. SOC. 937, 944 (2003).
128. See, e.g., Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 21, at 320. See generally, Alpert et
al., supra note 98, at 320.
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The first approach to studying racial disparities bypasses the
question of whether police intend to discriminate on the basis of
ethnicity or race, and instead focuses on disparate impacts of police
stop strategies. This strategy is prevalent in studies of decisions in the
context of highways stops.129 In this approach, comparisons of “hit
rates,” or efficiencies in the proportion of stops that yield positive
results, serve as evidence of disparate impacts of police stops.130 This
type of analysis has been used in several studies, including studies of
police behaviors on highways.131. This approach bypasses the supplyside question of who is stopped (and for what reason), and instead
looks only at disparate impacts or outcomes for different groups.
Outcome tests are usually agnostic with respect to race-based
motivations for stops or frisks versus a search for efficiency and
deterrence.132 They can show when a particular policy or decisionmaking outcome has a disparate impact whose racial
disproportionality is not justified by heightened institutional
productivity, negating an efficiency rationale. In the context of
profiling, outcome tests assume that the ex post probability that a
police search will uncover drugs or other contraband is a function of
the degree of probable cause that police use in deciding to stop and
search a suspect.133 If searches of minorities are less productive than
searches of Whites, this could be evidence that police have a lower
threshold of probable cause when searching minorities. At the very
least, it is a sign of differential treatment of minorities that in turn
produces a disparate impact.
Knowles, Persico, and Todd consider this “hit rate”
approach theoretically as well as empirically in a study finding that, of
the drivers on Interstate 95 in Maryland stopped by police on
suspicion of drug trafficking, African Americans were as likely as
Whites to have drugs in their cars.134 Their theoretical analysis posits
129. See, e.g., Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 21, at 320.
130. STEFANIE SEQUINO & NANCY BROOKS, RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
TRAFFIC STOPS: ANALYSIS OF VERMONT STATE POLICE DATA, 2010–2011, 5 (2014),
https://acluvt.org/issues/profiling/vsp_rpt_re-exam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75RHQ9AD].
131. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 204–05 (2001); Gross &
Barnes, supra note 114, at 667; Ayres, supra note 25, at 133; see also Durlauf,
Assessing Racial Profiling, supra note 105, at 403.
132. See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE (2001); Jeffrey Dominitz &
John Knowles, Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn from
Police Search Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368-F384 (2006).
133. Ayres, Outcome Tests, supra note 25.
134. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 131.
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a dynamic process that considers the behaviors of police and citizens
of different races, and integrates their decisions in equilibrium where
police calibrate their behavior to the probabilities of detecting illegal
behavior, and citizens in different racial groups adjust their
propensities to accommodate the likelihood of detection.135 They
concluded that the search for drugs was an efficient allocation of
police resources, despite the disparate impacts of these stops on
minority citizens.136
Outcome tests can be constructed as quasi-experiments, with race
as a treatment, to identify the role of race in the selection of citizens
for searches. Ridgeway matched suspects within officers to compare
the post-stop outcomes of White suspects to those of minority
suspects in similar locations, stopped at similar times and for the same
reasons.137 He reports no differences in post-stop arrests (“hit rates”)
despite the greater number of stops of non-Whites.138 But this
approach seeks to explain away contextual variables, especially
neighborhood context, rather than explicitly incorporate these factors
in an identification strategy. Close and Mason construct a disparate
outcome quasi-experiment to identify the role of race in police
searches by comparing the preferences of officers of different races to
search motorists, controlling for the motorist’s race.139 They use both
an outcomes-based non-parametric (quasi-experimental) analysis and
a standard benchmarking parametric (regression) approach, and
report both personal biases and police cultural bias in their propensity
to search African American and Latino drivers.140
These are useful but limited strategies. The robustness of these
designs is compromised, by the omission of several factors—some
unobservable and others usually absent from administrative data—
that might bias their claims, such as racial differences in the attributes

135. Id.
136. Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests, supra note 25; Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway (2002);
John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D., American Civil Liberties Union
(1997),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0003-0006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9FR-4C3X].
137. Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police
Department’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND Corporation, TR-534
(2007),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR534.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T64F-F4BG].
138. Id.
139. Billy R. Close & Patrick L. Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement:
Officer Characteristics and Racially-Biased Policing 3 REV. L. & ECON. 263–321
(2007).
140. Id.
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that police consider when deciding which motorists or pedestrians to
stop, search or arrest,141 or differences in police behavior in
neighborhoods or other social contexts with different racial
makeup.142 The omission of neighborhood context also biases
estimates of the proportionality of police stops of citizens. The
randomizing equilibrium assumptions in the Knowles et al.
approach—that both police and potential offenders adjust their
behavior in response to the joint probabilities of carrying contraband
and being stopped—tend to average across broad heterogeneous
conditions both in police decision making and offenders’ propensities
to crime,143 and discount the effects of race-specific sensitivities
toward crime decisions under varying conditions of detection risk via
police stop.144 When these two concerns are addressed, Dharmapala
and Ross identify different types of equilibria that lead to different
conclusions about racial prejudice in police stops and searches.145
Accordingly, the nature and extent of racial bias in the policing of
motorists and pedestrians remains unsettled empirically.146 Supplyside issues, both in the number and characteristics of the persons
available for stops by virtue of law violation or even suspicious
behavior, complicate the search game paradigm by skewing the
141. See, e.g., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen
Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407 (2005); Michael R. Smith, M. Makarios & Geoffrey P.
Alpert, Differential Suspicion: Theory Specification and Gender Effects in the Traffic
Stop Context, 23 JUST. Q. 271 (2006).
142. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion, supra note 98; Fagan & Davies, Street Stops
and Broken Windows, supra note 24; Douglas A. Smith, The Neighborhood Context
of Police Behavior, 8 CRIME & JUST. 313 (1986).
143. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, supra note 105, at 402; Dhammika
Dharmapala & Stephen L. Ross (2004), Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Additional Theory and Evidence, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. POL’Y & ANALYSIS,

art. 12, http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002f
j$002fbejeap.2003.3.issue-1$002fbejeap.2004.3.1.1310$002fbejeap.2004.3.1.1310.pdf?
t:ac=j$002fbejeap.2003.3.issue-1$002fbejeap.2004.3.1.1310$002fbejeap.2004.3.1.13
10.xml [https://perma.cc/9EPC-TK9B].
144. Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What
Can We Learn From Police Search Data? F368-F384 (Penn Inst. for Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 05-019, 2006).
145. Dharmapala & Ross, supra note 143.
146. Billy R. Close & Patrick Leon Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement:
Officer Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing, 3(2) J. L. & ECON. 263, 263–321
(2007); Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and
Airport Security, AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 127–31 (2009); Kate
Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the
Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163–177 (2009); John Donohue &
Steven Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J. L. & ECON. 367–94
(2001); David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a
Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 543–67 (2007).
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population of stopped drivers according to the ex ante probabilities of
criminality that police officers assign to different racial groups.
Institutional or individual differences in the goals of law enforcement
may also create heterogeneity both in the selection of individuals to
be stopped and the decisions to engage them in searches for drugs,
weapons, or other contraband. Officers may pursue one set of law
enforcement goals for one group—maximizing arrests—while
pursuing a different set of goals—minimizing crime—for another.
Racial nepotism or antagonism may lead to differences in police stop
and search behaviors when officers of one race face choices as to stop
or search a driver of the same or a different racial or ethnic group.147
These complexities illustrate the difficulty of identifying the role of
race in producing racial disparities in stops and searches, and suggest
a second approach that incorporates the contexts in which individual
officers consider race in their everyday interactions with citizens.
Gelman et al. and Alpert et al. show how neighborhood context
influences both the attribution of suspicion that animates an
encounter and the outcomes of police-citizen encounters.148 The
institutional context of policing also may influence individual officers’
decisions through stigmatizing neighborhoods as “high crime” or
disorderly, skewing how officers perceive and interpret the actions of
citizens. Institutional cultures also may implicitly tolerate such
perceptual or cognitive schema and internalize them into policy
preferences and strategic decisions, as well as internal preferences for
reward, promotion, or discipline.
One advantage of this approach is that it can accommodate
transparency, as the analyses in this Article show. When police scan
for suspicious behavior, we have only vague ideas about how their
discretion is managed, and even more vague ideas about what exactly
it is that they are looking for.149 While there may be nothing like an
algorithm to explain how observations are formed, there at least are
observable patterns. The worry in this regime is about race:
unconscious patterns that shape the formation of suspicion based on
archetypes such as the “symbolic assailant” and other processes that
shape cognition and interpretation of behavioral cues. Transparency
at least provides a window to observe what those processes produce.

147. Close & Mason, supra note 146.
148. Gelman, Fagan & Kiss supra note 79, at 813–23; Alpert et al., Police
Suspicion, supra note 98.
149. William H. Simon, In Defense of the Panopticon, BOS. REV. (Sept./Oct. 2014).
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In other words, it lets observers, assuming access to these records,
observe the observers as they conduct surveillance. 150
What remains unknown in this process is the harms that may
accrue from these routine invasions of privacy.151 The dignitarian
concerns pose one type of harm: the fact that one is a target of
surveillance signals to other observers and perhaps to the watching
public the person is a potential threat. That alone can have
stigmatizing consequences throughout the community of the
observed.152 Apart from the dignity worries, conducting these
observations and stops can have negative effects on the way that
police regard citizens and respect their autonomy and privacy.153
II. DATA AND METHODS
A. The Research Site
Boston, Massachusetts, is the site for this research. The FIO
strategy in Boston encompasses street encounters of the sort
envisioned in Terry, where officers temporarily detain and question
persons for whom they have reasonable and articulable suspicion that
This regime also includes non-contact
“crime is afoot.”154
observations, which we discussed earlier.
In this study, we analyzed data provided by the BPD on its FIO
activity. The BPD Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC)
maintains an electronic database of FIO reports.155 These forms are
used to document BPD officer interactions with individuals suspected
of criminal activity, or associates of those individuals, including direct
150. Worries about the panopticonistic approach range from anxiety about privacy
and anonymity of individuals in their everyday movements, to anxiety about easy
detection of and over-enforcement of low-stakes crimes, to the racial disparities that
may be inherent in such regimes. DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE
TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking
the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 10–15 (2010).
151. Stuntz, Fourth Amendment and Privacy, supra note 67.
152. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Hassle 113 MICH. L. REVIEW 461, 461–585 (2015)
(noting that when police conduct stops, the community watching those stops
internalizes the stigma attached to the person who has been stopped. When no
wrongdoing is found, the stigma may remain); see also Amanda B. Geller et al.,
Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2321(2014). There is no reason to believe that when police conduct such
observations, a stigma signal may be produced even in the absence of any contact.
153. David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069 (2014).
154. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
155. Id.
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encounters and non-contact observations.156 FIO reports are a
central activity in the BPD’s intelligence efforts to collect and analyze
data on the activities and whereabouts of known and suspected
criminals and their associates in Boston.157 The reports document the
name, date-of-birth, sex, and race of FIO subjects as well as the date,
time, and location of interaction.158
Our analysis focuses on the period from 2007 through 2010.
During that time, BPD officers made N=204,739 FIO reports.159
Compared to the residential population, the targets of FIO reports
were disproportionately male, young, and Black.160 For these 204,739
FIO reports, the subjects were 89.0% male, 54.7% ages 24 or younger,
and 63.3% Black.161 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010,
Boston had some 617,594 residents that were 47.9% male, 36.2% ages
24 or younger, and 25.1% Black.162
At first glance, these differences are suggestive of racially disparate
treatment in BPD FIO activity. However, these differences could
also reflect crime risk differences in Boston’s neighborhoods and
population groups. Criminological research has long documented
that criminal offenders are more likely to be young and male.163
Violent crime problems also tend to concentrate in highly
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods that are disproportionately
populated by Black residents.164
BPD officers are required to document the reason for the
completion of each FIO report and required to note whether they

156. Boston Police Department Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, Field
Interrogation, Observation, Frisk, and/or Search Reports, May 25, 2005, at 1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. American Fact Finder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://factfinder2.census.gov/

faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk
[https://perma.cc/J5NPAVSY] (accessed March 14, 2015).
163. David Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1986); Jeffery T.
Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal
Sentencing: The Punishment Costs of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 763–797 (1998).
164. Lauren J. Krivo, Ruth D. Peterson & Danielle C. Kuhl, Segregation, Racial
Structure, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1765–802 (2009).
“Concentrated disadvantage in urban neighborhoods, which are often populated by
black residents, undermines local collective efficacy and gravely limits the ability of
residents to address serious violent crime problems.” Anthony A. Braga & Rod K.
Brunson, The Police and Public Discourse on ‘Black-on-Black’ Violence, NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING, May 2015, at 8.
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conducted Terry frisks for officer safety purposes and/or searches for
the purposes of seizing evidence.165 Some 40.5% of the FIO reports
involve a frisk and/or search of the subject (82,919).166 Officers have
very limited space on the form to record their reasons for the FIO
and, unfortunately, 75.0% (153,554) of the FIO reports simply state
“investigation person” as the justification.167
This lack of
documentation of stop rationales prevents a Fourth Amendment
analysis of the legal justifications for discretionary stops and searches
of FIO subjects. Also, there is no information on the outcomes of the
FIO events about whether the frisks and searches led to arrests,
summons, or seizure of weapons or contraband. In fact, FIO events
that did lead to either of those outcomes are not recorded. Officers
default to the completion of an arrest report in those circumstances.
In turn, the type of outcome analysis that was essential to resolving
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in the Floyd stop-andfrisk litigation in New York could not be completed here.
B. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy combines two distinct approaches to
estimate racial disparities. The first strategy is a disparate treatment
strategy that examines stops in alternate empirical specifications
looking first at aggregates—neighborhoods or police districts—and
then individuals nested within those districts. We drew upon
regression models developed by Fagan and colleagues168 to
investigate alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution by the New York City Police Department
(“NYPD”) in their stop, question, and frisk (“SQF”) practices as part
of the David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al. U.S. District

165. Krivo, Peterson & Kuhl, supra note 164.
166. 38.6% of the FIO reports indicated that the subjects were frisked and 11.6% of
the FIO reports indicated that the subjects were searched. All but 1.8% of the
searches were reported in conjunction with a frisk of the subject. Moreover,
descriptive statistical analyses revealed that the biggest differences between FIO type
and subject race arose when the FIO involved a frisk and/or search relative to a more
simple observation and/or interrogation. Some 29.5% of White subjects were frisked
/ searched during an FIO relative to the 45.4% of Black subjects, 40.5% of Hispanic
subjects, and 35.6% of Asian or other race subjects. As such, FIO type was collapsed
into two categories: 0 = No Search (Observed and/or Interrogated only) and 1 =
Frisk and/or Search Conducted.
167. Id.
168. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (2010) in David Floyd et al. v. City of New
York et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034
(SAS), October 28; Gelman, Fagan & Kiss supra note 79.
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Court complaint.169 Their analyses examined whether the racial
composition of NYPD precinct residents predicted stop patterns after
controlling for the influences of crime, social conditions, and the
allocation of police resources.170 Here, we adapted their analytical
framework to examine whether the racial composition of Boston
neighborhoods predicts BPD FIO patterns, adjusting for crime, social
and economic predictors, and police resources.
The second strategy exploits the availability of data on officer race
to determine whether the observed differences in stop rates for White
and non-White youths are a function of preference-based
discrimination, or statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination
would reflect a tendency to stop one group at a higher rate than
another based on observable characteristics such as known crime
rates. But preference-based discrimination would reflect a tendency
to prefer one group for stops over others based on factors unrelated
to their observable differences in the targeted behavior.
A study by Professors Antonovics and Knight (AK) conducted this
type of analysis in Boston based on traffic stops by the BPD. AK
extended the Knowles, Persico and Todd (KPT)171 hit rate (or
equilibrium) test to test for bias in traffic stops by Boston police
officers from 2001–2003.172 Following the KPT equilibrium model,
AK assume that officers will rationally stop motorists according to
their beliefs about the comparative propensities to violate the law by
carrying contraband—drugs or weapons.173 If population groups
understand the risks of violating the law, they will adjust their
behaviors accordingly and their propensities should fall into
equilibrium with other groups and with officers’ preferences.174 In a
statistical model, differences in “hit rates” between groups should be

169. Second Amended Complaint, David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al.,
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS),
October 28.
170. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., in David Floyd et al. v. City of New York,
supra note 168; Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y.), 58–60 (2013).
171. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 134; see also Nicola Persico & Petra
Todd, Using Hit Rate Tests to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle
Searches in Wichita, 515 ECON. J. 351 (2006). For a critique of the KPT equilibrium
model, see David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of
a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J. OF PUB. ECON. THEORY 543 (2007).
172. Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling:
Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. OF ECON. & STAT., 163–77
(2009).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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negligible, a sign that equilibrium has been reached.175 This form of
statistical discrimination stands in contrast to preference based
discrimination, where police will stop motorists based on preferences
to detain or arrest citizens in a particular racial group independent
from their assumptions about that group’s propensity to carry
contraband.
In this case, AK were able to observe the race of both the officer
and the suspect and estimate the magnitude of preference-based
discrimination. AK used officer race-suspect race dyads as a
benchmark for discrimination, assuming that officers would be more
likely to stop and search a suspect from a different racial group.
Perhaps officers believe they are better able to detect signals of
wrongdoing among persons within their own race, or same-group
membership may lead to preferential treatment. Regardless of
motive, evidence of higher rates of cross-race differences in search
rates would suggest preference-based discrimination rather than
simply statistical discrimination based on general beliefs about crimepropensity within each racial or ethnic group. Other studies have
used the same strategy in different settings to reach the same
conclusions.176
However, the previous studies using officer-race benchmarks have
examined bias in vehicle searches pursuant to traffic stops. In our
strategy, we exploit the availability of these same data to estimate
race-based preferences among officers in street stops, preferences
that are not easily explained by assumptions about each group’s
propensity for crime.

175. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 134. But see Bernard Harcourt, Against
Profiling, supra note 116 (arguing that the assumptions of consistent responses—or

elasticities—across different racial groups is unrealistic given their overall exposure
to both legal earning and the potential punishment costs from detection).
176. Close & Mason, supra note 146; Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Profiling
and Consent (Colum. L. Sch., Working Paper, 2010), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1641326 [https://perma.cc/WL2D-ABGE]; J. Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton
Mosher & Travis Pratt, Search And Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A
Disparate Impact Framework, 3 L. & POL’Y 1 (2009). But see Rob Tillyer, Charles F.
Klahm & Robin S. Engel, The Discretion to Search: A Multilevel Examination of
Driver Demographics and Officer Characteristics, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST.
184,184–205 (2012) (showing that suspect race effects are reduced after controlling
for a set of contextual effects, but remain significant).
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1. Disparate Treatment by Race
The general test for evidence of disparate treatment is a regression
equation that takes the form:
Outcome = α + β1*Minority + Σiβi*(Plausible non-Race Influences) + εi

where Outcome is the event or status of interest, Minority is an
indicator for the racial composition or status of the unit observed (i.e.,
neighborhood or person, depending on the outcome), Plausible NonRace Influences are a set of variables representing non-race factors
that also might influence the outcome, and an error term that
captures the variation in the outcome that cannot be explained by
either Minority status or the Non-Race Influences. These models
may include non-race influences that are correlated with race, so as to
better identify the unique effects of race that are present once the
influence of proxies for race are removed.177 The goal in specifying
these models is to identify the effects of race on outcomes after
simultaneously considering factors that may be relevant to race.178
Under a disparate treatment theory, the critical question is whether

177. For a general discussion of the specification of regression models to test for
disparate treatment, see generally D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights
Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 565–72 (2008) (arguing for an analytic approach
simulating an experiment by searching for units (persons) that are similar to one
another in all observable ways except treatment (in our case, suspect race), ignoring
the data from units that have no counterparts or matches, and conducting separate
regressions for the “treated” and “untreated groups). However, balancing between
“treated” and “untreated” groups is made more difficult and less reliable by the
sorting processes of individuals to treatments, or by limitations in the number and
types of covariates that explain such sorting, and the plausibility of such
counterfactuals. In our case, people are not randomly “allocated” to race, nor are the
factors that explain racial sorting by age and socio-economic status, as well as by
neighborhood or other important context such as school randomly distributed. And,
searching only for “matched” cases inevitably results in discarding data and loss of
precision. One solution is separate regressions for each “treatment” condition to
determine what might take place for cases that were excluded due to lack of plausible
counterfactuals, and appending this information to the basic comparisons across
groups. For a general discussion of how regressions specify these sorting mechanisms
that influence predictors of an outcome, see Thomas J. Campbell, Regression

Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other
Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984).
178. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In a disparate

treatment claim, we would ask if the use of a high school diploma requirement biases
the hiring process since African American job applicants may be less likely to have
obtained a high school diploma. Once this race-correlated control is introduced, it
would likely reduce the racial disparity in the hiring rates and provide a different test
than would a simple disparate impact test.
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an applicant’s race was the cause of being denied employment.
Failure to do so raises the risk of “omitted variable bias,” which could
lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of variables that do
appear in a regression test.179

2. Measures and Model Specification
We analyze differences in stop rates by neighborhood to determine
whether FIO activity is explained by local crime rates, or if there is
additional variance that is explained by race. A race-neutral practice
would predict a positive effect for local crime rates and nonsignificant effects for race once we control for crime.
The neighborhood analyses were conducted using 2010 U.S.
Census tracts as the principal unit of analysis. Census tracts were
used instead of BPD geographic units (e.g. districts, reporting areas)
or smaller areal units (e.g. Census block groups, street segments).
Tracts are areas roughly equivalent to neighborhoods developed by
the U.S. Census Bureau for the purposes of analyzing populations.180
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Boston was comprised of N=181
tracts. Data on the social and economic conditions in these tracts
were obtained from the 2007–2010 American Community Survey
(ACS).181 Eight tracts were excluded from the analysis because there
were no residents in these areas for a total N=173 tracts.182 The FIO
data included date and geographical location (x-y coordinates)
information that permitted aggregation of FIO counts to Census
tracts and by differing time periods.183 The main outcome variable
was the monthly count of FIOs made in each Census tract between
2007 and 2010 (N=8,304; 173 Census tracts with 48 observations
each).

179. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts
in Organ Transplantation: The Problem of ‘Included Variable’ Bias, 48 PERSP.
BIOLOGY MED. 68 (2005); Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of
‘Included Variable Bias’ (Yale L. Sch., Working Paper, 2010), https://perma.cc/G837-

UPYY.
180. 2010 Geographic Terms and Concepts—Census Tract, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_ct.html
[https://perma.cc/2KH5SHWF]; Nancy Krieger, A Century of Census Tracts: Health and the Body Politic
(1906–2006), 83(3) J. URB. HEALTH 355 (2006).
181. American
Community
Survey
(ACS),
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/acs/ [https://perma.cc/48SE-HGK3].
182. These eight Census tracts included the Stony Brook reservation, Belle Isle
Marsh reservation, the Harbor Islands, the Esplanade recreational area, the Franklin
Park recreational area, and three commercial property waterfront areas.
183. 95.2% (194,858 of 204,739) of the FIO reports were geocoded to 2010 Census
Tracts in Boston.
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The specific estimation technique for this analysis, or the functional
form of the regression equation, was responsive to the specific
measure of FIO activity (monthly counts in Census tract units).
Accordingly, models were estimated using negative binomial
regressions. This class of regression models is appropriate for counts
of events, such as FIO reports in a specific area, where assumptions
about the independence of events cannot be reliably made.184 These
models also are appropriate for counts where the distribution are
over-dispersed; that is, where the variance exceeds the sample mean.
The model takes the form of:
Г
p
!Γ
where Yi is the expected count of events in each unit i given
parameters that we observe. We estimate the incidence of events for
overdispersed models as:
Ε

|Χ ,

exp〖

where hi = exp(εi) is assumed to have a one parameter gamma
distribution, G (θ,θ) with mean 1 and variance 1 / θ = κ .
We used a specific form of negative binomial regression known as
General Estimating Equations (GEEs).185 GEEs are beneficial for
nested or hierarchically organized data, such as years within Census
tracts, as they allow for the specification of within-subject correlations
of observations. These nesting variables are treated as random effects
in the estimating models. Random effects here include census tract
correlations. To adjust for difference in population densities in the
census tracts, we estimated population-averaged models. Since the
analyses include a sequence of time periods (calendar months), the
models include an AR(1) variance estimation function that adjusts for
the serial autocorrelation (or autoregression) of the counts of events
184. Negative binomial regressions also are especially useful for discrete data such
as event counts when the variance exceeds the mean across areas. JOSEPH M. HILBE,
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION (2007); see also Richard Berk & John M.
MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 24 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY
269 (2008); D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate
Crime Rates, 16 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 21 (2000); David A. Freedman, Statistical
Models: Theory and Practice (2005); WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
(2003).
185. JAMES W. HARDIN & JOSEPH M. HILBE, GENERALIZED ESTIMATING
EQUATION (2003); Gary A. Ballinger, Using Generalized Estimating Equations for
Longitudinal Data Analysis, 7 ORG. RES. METHODS 127 (2004).
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within sampling units over long periods of time.186 We controlled for
yearly and seasonal variations187 in the monthly counts of FIO reports
by including fixed-effects for calendar quarter and year.188
Police activity in Boston is closely linked to crime.189 As such, we
test whether crime rates in a neighborhood are linked to the intensity
of BPD FIO activity in that area. We use crime incident data
generated by the BPD on 113,419 “index” crime incidents in Boston
between 2007 and 2010.190 These crime incident data were geocoded,
and then aggregated by Census tract and month of occurrence to
create a covariate measuring lagged and logged monthly counts of
serious crime in Boston census tracts.191 As Figure 1 reveals, FIO
reports made by BPD officers in 2010 tended to concentrate in census
tracts with higher rates of total crime incidents and higher
percentages of black resident populations. Figure 1 also shows a high
degree of spatial autocorrelation in the concentration of FIO reports

186. AR(1) adjustments reflect the reality that the best predictor of what the crime
rate will be in the next month is what it was in last month. This is an empirical
constraint in identifying the relationship between crime and policing. Failure to
correct for this temporal dependence will bias the standard errors in estimates of
crime effects on policing, and this distortion remains even when fixed effects are used
to control for temporal trends. See BADI BALTAGI, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
PANEL DATA (2001); Badi Baltagi & Qi Li, Testing AR(1) Against MA(1)
Disturbances in an Error Component Model, 68 J. OF ECONOMETRICS 133 (1995).
187. There is a long tradition of studies of the seasonality of crime and the
theoretical explanations for why crime varies by season. See, e.g., John R. Hipp et
al., Crime of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two Explanations of
Seasonal Change in Crime, 82 SOC. FORCES 1333 (2004).
188. We created indicator variables to account for seasonal variations by calendar
quarter. Quarter 1 represented January, February, and March monthly FIO counts
(1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 2 represented April, May, and June monthly FIO counts
(1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 3 represented July, August, and September monthly FIO
counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 4 represented October, November, and December
monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Quarter 1 served as the reference category
for the seasonal polychotomous dummy variable. We also created indicator variables
for year to account for annual variations in the data.
189. Anthony A. Braga et al., An Ex-Post-Facto Evaluation Framework for PlaceBased Police Interventions, 35 EVALUATION REV. 592 (2011).
190. Index crimes, as defined by the FBI, included murder, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, and larceny. See FBI, Uniform Crime
Reporting, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr [https://perma.cc/9JS2-5A78]. Using
ArcGIS 10.2 mapping software, the BRIC was able to geocode 113,152 of these
incidents to their respective Census tracts (99.8 % of 113,419 total crime incidents).
191. All models control for the one-month-lag of logged total crime incidents. The
natural log transformation of the actual number of crimes was used. Log
transformation is necessary to adjust when the distributions are highly skewed and
non-linear. The lag reflects the police planning process whereby FIO reports and
other enforcement activity are adjusted to reflect actual crime conditions.
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across Census tracts.192 We controlled for this spatial dependence in
our regression models by including a Moran’s I spatial effects
covariate.193

192. Spatial dependence, or autocorrelation, violates the assumption of
independence among observations used in most statistical models. Spatial regression
analyses of the variation of crime, etc., across neighborhood units account for spatial
autocorrelation through the addition of a spatial effects covariate such as Moran’s I .
The argument is that analyses that do not compensate for spatial dependency can
have unstable parameter estimates and yield unreliable significance tests. See
MICHAEL D. WARD & KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH, SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS
8–10 (Sage U. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in Soc. Sci., No. 155, 2008).
193. ArcGIS 10.2 was used to export a shapefile containing the total number of
FIOs made per U.S. Census Tract during the study time period to GeoDa 1.4.6
spatial analysis software. Using queen’s contiguity, a Moran’s I = 0.674689 was
estimated (199 permutations, z = 14.73, p<.005; 99 permutations, z = 15.18, p<.01).
The Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation lag for each Census Tract was exported to
Stata 13.1 and included in the neighborhood analysis.
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We also control for police deployment patterns. The allocation of
police and targeting of police activity frequently involved
“saturation” deployment of police patrols in higher crime areas.
Since these areas in Boston and elsewhere often had higher
concentrations of non-White residents,194 asymmetrical deployments
of police increased exposure of citizens to police and thus the
increased probability of encounters with minority citizens as

194. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations, RaceEthnic Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623(1) AM. ACADEMY OF

POL. & SOC. SCI. 93–107 (2009).
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compared to Whites,195 in turn producing racial or ethnic differences
in contact patterns. Accordingly, an analysis of FIO patterns by
neighborhood required an understanding of the allocation of police
patrol resources in each unit of analysis. Patrol strength data were
provided by the BPD for each of their eleven policing districts
between 2007 and 2010. These patrol data were then allocated to
each Boston census tract.196
It is also important to note that the regulation and oversight of FIO
policy and activities takes place at the police district level. There are
12 police districts in Boston, each commanded by a police captain
who reports directly to the Superintendent of the Bureau of Field
Services. BPD Captains are accountable for district-level crime
trends and have discretion to allocate officers tactically within
districts. Since tracts are nested within Boston’s policing districts, we
included fixed effects to account for any unobserved effects of
conditions in the districts that might influence police activity, such as
district-level variations in the use of FIOs to gather intelligence and
maintain contact with potential offenders.197
Several studies show that neighborhood crime rates, including
violent crime, 198 are strongly associated with concentrated social

195. See, e.g., Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Marcinda Mason & Matthew Zingraff,
Looking for the Driving While Black Phenomena: Conceptualizing Racial Bias
Processes and their Associated Distributions, 7 POLICE Q. 3 (2004).
196. Because BPD districts do not, as a rule, share boundaries with Census tracts,
we allocated patrol strength to tracts based on the percent of each district’s area that
falls into each tract. For example, if Census tract A shares area with three police
districts (A1, A2, and A3), the Census tract patrol strength was estimated as [(% of
A1 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A1) + (% of A2 falling into tract A * patrol
strength of A2) + (% of A3 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A3)].
197. The BPD has twelve districts that provide policing services across Boston’s
neighborhoods: A-1 serving Downtown, Beacon Hill, and Chinatown neighborhoods;
A-15 serving Charlestown; A-7 serving East Boston; B-2 serving Roxbury and
Mission Hill neighborhoods; B-3 serving Mattapan and parts of North Dorchester; C6 serving South Boston; C-11 serving most of Dorchester; D-4 serving Back Bay,
Fenway, and South End neighborhoods; D-14 serving Allston and Brighton
neighborhoods; E-5 serving West Roxbury and Roslindale neighborhoods; E-13
serving Jamaica Plain; and E-18 serving Hyde Park. The reference category for the
BPD district dummy variable was E-13. For a basic review of the use of dummy
variables in regression models, see MELISSA A. HARDY, REGRESSION WITH DUMMY
VARIABLES 7–16 (Sage U. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sci.,
No. 07-093, 1993).
198. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race,
Crime, and Urban Inequality in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 38 (John Hagan & Ruth
Peterson eds., 1995); Robert J. Sampson, Steven Raudenbush & Felton Earls,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277
SCI. 918, 918 (1997); Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Steven Raudenbush,
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disadvantage.199
The concentrated disadvantage index is a
standardized index composed of the percentage of residents who are
Black, the percentage of residents receiving public assistance, the
percentage of families living below the poverty line, the percentage of
female-headed households with children under the age of 18, and the
percentage of unemployed residents (as measured by the percentage
of men over the age 16 who did not work in the previous year).200
Because we are explicitly interested the independent impact of race
on the number of FIO reports in a neighborhood controlling for other
factors, we excluded the percentage of Black residents from the
construction of the Boston concentrated disadvantage used in this
analysis. Because of the high correlation among these variables, we
conducted principal components factor analysis to identify the
underlying dimensions among the variables.201 This procedure
revealed that variables load on a single factor (which was retained as
a standardized disadvantage index variable).202 The presence of
concentrations of recent immigrants is a protective factor that reduces
the risk of crime in a neighborhood.203 As such, we created a variable
that measured the percentage of foreign-born residents in each
Census tract.

Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban
Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 518 (2001).
199. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 198, at 45; Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush,
supra note 198, at 518.
200. Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 198, at 527.
201. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that captures consistency among
observed variables to generate a composite measure using a lower number of
unobserved variables. The method produces factors that represent the correlations
among the observed measures. See JAE-ON KIM ET AL., FACTOR ANALYSIS:
STATISTICAL METHODS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES at 8–9 (Sage U. Paper Series on
Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sci., No. 07-014, 1978). The principal
components factor analysis was completed using STATA 13.1.
202. For example, a Boston Census tract featuring a disadvantage index score of
1.5 would be 1.5 standard deviations more disadvantaged than the mean Boston
Census tract. As such, the disadvantage index is adjusted specifically for the city of
Boston using 2010 ACS variables, even while the components used to construct the
index remain constant across much neighborhood research and remain robust
predictors of crime across a variety of city types and spatial aggregations. See
Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, supra note 198, at 920–21; Morenoff, Sampson &
Raudenbush, supra note 198, at 543–44.
203. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, 7
CONTEXTS 28, 28–33 (2008), https://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/01/contexts_
winter08_sampson.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSM5-CZNC].
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3. Benchmarks
The selection of a benchmark against which to assess police
enforcement activity is a basic question in reliably measuring the
extent of racial disparities in police-citizen interactions. 204 A
benchmark allows us to determine if Boston Police are selectively, on
the basis of race or another prohibited factor, singling out persons for
FIO reports. As such, we compare the police decision to complete an
FIO report on someone to their availability and eligibility for such
reports, and compare that calculation across racial and ethnic groups.
It is not hard to see that the reliability of an estimate of the extent of
racial disproportionality or fairness is likely to depend on—and be
particularly sensitive to—the benchmark used to measure criminal
behavior.
Population is one measure of the supply of people available to the
police for surveillance and possibly stops. However, there are
constraints on local population estimates that limit its utility as a
benchmark for the behavior of the police. Residential population
estimates in commercial parts of Boston are often unreliable
estimates of the actual composition of persons who are visible and
available to the police during certain hours of the day. And, similarly,
if people leave residential areas to work in commercial areas, the
estimates in the residential areas will also be biased and inaccurate.
Another reason that population may not be an incomplete
benchmark is that BPD officers do not complete FIO reports
randomly based on the population parameters of an area.205 In fact,

204. The issues in benchmarking for pedestrian stops can be different from those
that influence decisions on how to benchmark for traffic stops. See generally LORI A.
FRIDELL, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, BY THE NUMBERS: A GUIDE FOR
ANALYZING DATA FROM VEHICLE STOPS (2004); Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science
and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 104 (2002); Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests of
Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 133 (2002); Greg
Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in
RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: ESSENTIAL READINGS 180 (S.K. Rice & M.D.
White eds., 2010). See also Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator:
Problems with Police Traffic Stop Data and an Early Warning Solution, 4 JUST. RES.
& POL’Y 133 (2002). The Fagan and Walker articles respectively wrestle with the
unique demands of benchmarking for pedestrian stops (comparing the adequacy of
benchmarks based on racial composition of local populations, the distribution of
behaviors associated with criminal activity, the racial composition of known criminal
offenders or suspects, local area crime rates, or comparisons of the behaviors of
police officers of different races confronting suspects of different races).
205. See BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 323: FIELD INTERACTION/OBSERVATION/
ENCOUNTER REPORT (FIOE REPORT) (2015), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/56a2569205caa7ee9f29e6a2/1453479570208/rule323.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2RQZ-PQ86]; JEFFREY FAGAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT: AN
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police complete FIO reports of persons based on, at least in theory,
their perceptions of suspected crime, or their evaluation of citizen
behaviors that may provide reasonable indicia of the potential that a
crime has occurred or is about to take place.206 To the extent that
rates of crime suspicion are correlated with rates of crime
commission, observed crime rates are useful candidates to serve as a
component of a benchmark.207
For this analysis of BPD FIO activity, a valid benchmark requires
estimates of the supply of individuals of each racial or ethnic group
who are engaged in the targeted behaviors and who are available to
the police as targets of their stop authority and intelligence gathering
activities. Since police often target resources to the places where
crime rates and risks are highest, and where populations are
highest,208 some measure of population that is conditioned on crime
rates is an optimal candidate for inclusion as a benchmark.
The challenge in following this strategy is to identify a valid
measure of crime. Ideally, we would include measures of the racespecific crime rates in each tract (or other social area) to help
construct precise benchmarks based on the participation in the
behavior of interest by persons of each race and ethnicity. However,
there are practical problems in this approach. For example, many
crimes are unreported to the police, and there are no valid victim
surveys from which we can measure crime rates.209 There are
similarly no surveys of self-reported crimes.210 Race-specific arrest
rates have been used as a proxy for race-specific crime rates, with a

ANALYSIS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY PATTERNS IN BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIELD INTERROGATION, OBSERVATION, FRISK, AND/OR SEARCH REPORTS 1–3 (2015).
206. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 829 (2011).
207. Geoffrey Alpert et al., supra note 98, at 411–13.
208. Id.
209. Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in
Crime Research, 25 CRIME & JUST. 291, 292 (1999). However, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics manages the National Crime Victimization Survey, “in which interviewed
persons are asked about the number and characteristics of victimizations experienced
during the prior 6 months” and extrapolates crime rates based off the information
from the survey. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DATA COLLECTION: NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (NCVS) (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dc
detail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/U953-LYL3]; Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langston,
Criminal Victimization, 2014, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Sept. 29, 2015, at 1,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WAG-WGVF]; LYNN
LANGSTON ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE
POLICE 1 (2012).
210. See also Junger-Tas & Marshall, supra note 209, at 348–53 (assessing
drawbacks of self-report studies).
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lag function that reduces (but hardly eliminates) the problem of
correlated error terms between current enforcement and past
enforcement.211 However, there is strong disagreement about the
validity of prior arrest rates, with some analysts offering positive
rationales,212 while others have been critical.213
An alternative measure is crimes reported to the police. However,
crime reports do not provide a complete picture of the racial makeup
of the offenders in those crimes.214 While crime reports may provide
a snapshot of the racial composition of those involved in crime
commission, it is just that: a snapshot with only partial coverage of
criminal activity. The data are further limited by the fact that many
reported crimes lack a suspect identification or description.215
Moreover, some types of suspected crimes that motivate FIO activity,
such as weapons possession or drug possession, often do not follow
from crime reports that identify the race of a suspect, so these base
rates of offending are unknown.216 Calls for service to the police are
yet a third index, but 911 calls of this sort are difficult to apply to
proactive patrol or the “new policing” given varying incidents of
211. See, e.g., FAGAN
supra note 79, at 813.

ET AL.,

supra note 20, at 309, 310; Gelman, Fagan & Kiss,

212. Expert Report of Dennis Smith at 22–26, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010) (arguing that arrest
statistics reveal patterns of crime suspects that can inform analyses of racial bias in
police activity).
213. Arrest data incorporate information about crime patterns, but also contain
uncertainty about unobservable components because of police decisions about
allocating officers to specific places. See generally Greg Ridgeway & John
MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY
AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 180 (S.K. Rice & M.D. White eds.,
2010).
214. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/N2PD-NUAB] (noting that
not all agencies provided ethnicity breakdowns of offenders); see generally WILLIAM
BRATTON, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK
CITY (JAN. 1- DEC. 31, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_
and_planning/year_end_2015_enforcement_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T63LPGSA]; see also Dov Fox, The Second Generation of Racial Profiling, 38 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 49, 49–50 (2010).
215. Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with
the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 262 n.349
(2003).
216. Lesser included offenses are not always included on crime reports. However,
the FBI does frequently collect lesser included offenses for its hate crime database.
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENF’T SUPPORT SECTION & CRIME
STATISTICS MGMT. UNIT HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES AND
TRAINING MANUAL 52 (2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime-datacollection-guidelines-and-training-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAL-X8YH].
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mistaken reports and the heterogeneity of the purpose of the calls
that include serious crimes, cats in trees, multiple reports of the same
gunshot, domestic disturbances, or car break-ins.217
To the extent that observed or reported crimes are leading
indicators of those behaviors that are correlated with crime, crimes
known to the police are important part of a valid benchmark. So too
is population, as an index of the overall exposure of citizen as
available targets for surveillance and interdiction. Accordingly, these
analyses use both population and reported crime as benchmarks for
understanding the racial distribution of FIO reports. Sensitivity tests
applied alternate benchmarks including lagged race-specific arrest
rates218 and lagged race-specific suspect rates.219 Natural log of the
Census tract population, total number of arrested individuals in
Census tract, and total number of suspects reported in Census tract
were used as the offsets in the regression models.
These analyses were designed to test whether monthly counts of
FIO reports in Census tracts were disproportionate to the racial
composition of tract residents, racial composition of arrested suspects
in the tract, and the racial composition of crime suspects as reported
by victims in crime incident reports, after controlling for the known
crime rate in the previous month and other characteristics that are
correlated with crime. For each racial composition benchmark, three
race categories (percent Black, percent Hispanic, and percent Asian
or other) are included and the category of percent White is omitted.
217. Robin S. Engel, Michael R. Smith & Francis T. Cullen, Race, Place, and Drug
Enforcement, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 603, 605 (2012) (claiming that 911 calls

are a more robust and accurate measure of the relative crime problems in an area
than are either arrests or reported crimes). But see Stephen D. Mastrofski, Race,
Policing, and Equity, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 593, 597 (2012) (critiquing the
use of 911 calls as a basis of suspicion to either allocate officers or justify the
formation of suspicions necessary for a valid Terry stop or probable cause for a
search or an arrest).
218. Between 2007 and 2010, the BPD arrested 28,427 suspects. The racial
distribution of arrested suspects was as follows: 50.4% Black, 26.8% White, 20.6%
Hispanic, and 2.2% Asian or other race category. Using ArcGIS 10.2 mapping
software, the BRIC was able to geocode 24,590 of these arrests to their respective
Census tracts (86.5% of 28,427 total arrests). While a 100% geocoding rate is always
desired, the geocode rate in the current study exceeds the minimum acceptable
threshold of 85%. See Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Geocoding Crime and a First Estimate of a
Minimum Acceptable Hit Rate, 18 INT’L J. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO. SCI. 61, 61–72
(2004).
219. As described earlier, between 2007 and 2010, there were 113,419 Part I UCR
crime incidents in Boston. Victims in these incidents reported information on
340,585 suspects. The racial distribution of these suspects was as follows: 41.2%
Black, 21.8% White, 17.3% Hispanic, 2.0% Asian or other race category, and 17.7%
unknown race.
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This was done to avoid collinearity in the model estimation. As such,
the coefficients for each racial group are based on comparison with
the percent White of the benchmark in the tract. When a racial
composition variable is significant, this means that its relationship to
FIO activity is significantly different from that of the White racial
composition of that benchmark in the Census tract. The parameter
estimates were expressed as incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated
coefficients)220 and robust standard errors clustered by tracts were
used.221
III. RESULTS
A. Suspects and Officers
Table 1 shows the characteristics of both suspects and officers.
Suspect identifiers were available for 199,331 (97.4% of 204,739) FIO
encounters between 2007 and 2010.222 From these, we were able to
identify N = 72,619 unique subjects.
Using gang intelligence
databases maintained by BPD, we estimated that 5.5% (3967 of
72,619) of the suspects in FIO encounters were classified as gang
members.223 The number of FIO’s per suspect ranged from 1 to 249,
220. Incidence rate ratios are interpreted as the rate at which things occur; for
example, an incidence rate ratio of 1.10 would suggest that, controlling for other
independent variables, a one unit increase in the selected independent variable was
associated with a ten percent increase in the rate at which the dependent variable
occurs. See SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND
LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA, VOLUME II: CATEGORICAL RESPONSES,
COUNTS AND SURVIVAL 374–76 (2005); see also KENNETH ROTHMAN & S.
GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 34–36 (2008).
221. Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking
and False Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 661, 664 (2009); see also Gary King & Margaret E. Roberts, How Robust

Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to
Do About It, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 159, 161–64 (2015).
222. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5, 6 tbl. 1; see also CITY OF BOSTON, BOSTON

POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015,
https://data.cityofboston.gov/Public-Safety/Boston-Police-Department-FIO/xmmki78r [https://perma.cc/RMT5-VCCP] (for information about FIO encounters between
2011 and 2015).
223. See ANTHONY A. BRAGA, DAVID M. HUREAU, & LEIGH GROSSMAN,
MANAGING THE GROUP VIOLENCE INTERVENTION: USING SHOOTING SCORECARDS
TO TRACK GROUP VIOLENCE 15 (2014). The Boston Regional Intelligence Center
(BRIC) created a classification system using several parameters to identify
individuals as gang members. To be classified as a gang member by BRIC, a person
has to accumulate ten points based upon the following criteria: prior validation by a
BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses the same selection criteria (nine
points), prior validation by a non-BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses
similar selection criteria (eight points), self-admitted gang membership (eight points),
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with an average of 2.74 FIO events per suspect, during the study
period.224 About half (48.5%) had been arrested, with the number of
arrests ranged from 1 to 63, with a mean of 5 arrests.225

use and/or possession of gang paraphernalia or identifiers (four points), gang-related
photograph (two points), known gang tattoo or marking (eight points), information
from reliable confidential informant (five points), information from anonymous
source or tipster (one point), crime victim associated with rival gang (three or eight
points depending on incarceration status), possession of gang documents such as bylaws (three or eight points depending on incarceration status), possession of gang
publications (two points), participation in gang publication (eight points), possession
of court and/or investigative documents involving an identified gang member (nine
points), possession of printed or electronic media indicating membership (one point),
contact with known gang members via FIO reports (two points per report), named in
police incident report involving known gang member (four points per report),
possession of gang membership material (nine points), information developed during
surveillance and/or surveillance (five points), and other information (one point). Id.
at 15 n.2.
224. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
225. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also Shima Baradaran & Frank L.
McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 536 (2012) (“A person’s number
of previous arrests is a large predictor of future re-arrest; however, whether or not
that prior arrest turned into a conviction is largely irrelevant as an additional
predictor.”); Avinash Singh Bhati & Alex R. Piquero, Estimating the Impact of

Incarceration on Subsequent Offending Trajectories: Deterrent, Criminogenic, or
Null Effect?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207, 216 (2007) (“[P]rior arrests were

associated with recidivism.”).
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Table 1. Age, Gender, and Race of Unique BPD FIO Subjects and Officers

FIO Subjects,
N=72,619

FIO Officers,
N=1750a

N

Percent

N

Percent

59,438
13,181

81.8
18.2

1,558
192

89
11

9,201
24,471
12,375
6,417
5,636
9,650
4,869

12.7
33.7
17
8.8
7.8
13.3
6.7

0
10
208
286
356
609
281

0
0.6
11.9
16.3
20.3
34.8
16.1

Gender
Male
Female

Age
Below 18
18–24
25–30
31–35
36–40
41–50
51 and older
Mean
Median
Range

29.2
26
12 to 71 years

41.3
41
23 to 64 years

Race
Black
White
Hispanic
Asian / Other
Unknown

30,849
25,758
9,693
1,321
4,998

42.5
35.5
13.3
1.8
6.9

3,967
35,256

5.5
48.5

65
212
1,379
130
23
6

3.7
12.1
78.8
7.4
1.3
0.3

418
1,139
150
43
0

23.9
65.1
8.6
2.5
0

Selected Characteristics
Subjects
Gang member
Prior arrest (1+)
Officers
Gang Unit (YVSF)
Detective (any rank)
Patrol Officer
Patrol Sergeant
Patrol Lieutenant / Captain
Dep. Supt. / Superintendent

Note: a. These are the officers who have had one or more FIO encounter over the study interval.
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Most suspects were young: nearly half were younger than 25 years
of age.226 One in three (33.7%) were between 18 and 24 years of
age.227 Most were male (81.8%), consistent with known gender
differences in crime rates by gender.228 Most suspects were Black
(42.5%) or Hispanic (13.3%), each above their respective share of
population in Boston in the 2010 census.229 Whites were underrepresented in the FIO subject pool relative to population share. 230
As we discussed earlier, population is a weak benchmark, and we
control for local crime rates in subsequent analyses.
About half of the FIO suspects (48.5%) had one or more prior
arrests, and half did not.231 To the extent that stops in general carry

226. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222; Bhati & Piquero, supra
note 225, at 216 (“[A]ge was inversely associated with recidivism (older offenders
were less likely to recidivate).”).
227. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5.
228. Id.; see also UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 228; Janet L. Lauritsen,
Karen Heimer & James P. Lynch, Trends in the Gender Gap in Violent Offending:
New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 361,
362 (2009); Bhati & Piquero, supra note 225, at 216–17.
229. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census
Interactive Population Search, Boston City, Massachusetts, http://www.census.gov/
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=25:2507000
[https://perma.cc/ME59-MWY4];
Bos. Police Dep’t, Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and
Observation (FIO) Study Results, Oct. 8, 2014, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/
boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fiostudy-results [https://perma.cc/R7EE-52JQ] (“It also showed that Black subjects are
8% more likely to be stopped repeatedly and 12% more likely to be frisked and
searched when controlling for other factors like Criminal History and Gang
Membership in Violent Crime areas.”); Marina Carver, Study Finds Boston Police
Target African-Americans Disproportionately, CNN (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/09/us/boston-police-stop-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/64V8F7W4]; Sebastian Murdock, The Staggering Racial Disparity In Boston’s Police
Encounters, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/10/08/stop-and-frisk-boston_n_5953688.html [https://perma.cc/BD7S-W9HW].
The American Civil Liberties Union also produced a report on the impact of BPD’s
policing. See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED 1 (2014),
https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2015/06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5K7-DQQT]. See also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD
FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 236.
230. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census
Interactive Population Search: Boston City, Massachusetts, http://www.census.gov/
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=25:2507000 [https://perma.cc/5J3Z-W9YX] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016); see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM
2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
231. Bhati & Piquero, supra note 225, at 216; see also BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
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risks of social and psychological harms,232 the reach of FIOs to
persons with no prior record extends an umbrella of suspicion to a
group of primarily young people with no known criminal
involvement.
Gangs are a focus of Boston police tactics.233 Yet few of the FIO
suspects (5.5%) were known to the police as gang members.234 The
department’s gang unit was proportionately small, with 3.7% of the
population of officers who were in the FIO database.235
BPD Officers were older,236 not surprisingly, but their age
distribution suggests that they were experienced. More than half
were over 40 years of age (50.9%), with a median age of 41.3 years.237
Nearly two officers in three were White (65.1%), and about one in
four was Black (23.9%).238 Most were assigned to patrol commands,
with about one in eight (12.1%) holding a detective’s shield.239

232. Stuntz, supra note 67, at 1218; see also Ekow N. Yankah, Policing Ourselves:
A Republican Theory of Citizenship, Dignity and Policing–A Comment on Fagan 2–

3 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 400, 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2258048 [https://perma.cc/385T-7A93].
233. See BRAGA, HUREAU, & GROSSMAN, supra note 223, at 13–14.
234. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; BRAGA, HUREAU, & GROSSMAN, supra
note 223, at 13–14. But see Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field
Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note 229 (“Gang
Membership and prior arrest history are very strong predictors of repeated FIO’s.”);
Bos. Police Dep’t, Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency
and Accountability of Policing Activities to the Public, Jan. 8, 2016,
http://bpdnews.com/news/2016/1/7/commissioner-evans-continues-efforts-to-increasetransparency-and-accountability-of-policing-activities-to-the-public [https://perma.cc/
5FFZ-XLSV] (“[O]fficers were repeatedly stopping or observing individuals with
criminal records and/or gang affiliation.”).
235. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see Bos. Police Dep’t, Operation
Ceasefire, http://bpdnews.com/operation-ceasefire/ [https://perma.cc/GY56-HZH8];
see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015,
supra note 222.
236. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7.
237. Id. Similarly, in 2010, the median age of the Boston police force was 44.32
years. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2010), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/511a8170e4b0d00cab69226e/1360691568147/Annu
al+Report+2010-small.pdf [https://perma.cc/U78V-DYNN].
238. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. Similarly, in its 2015
Workforce Report, the City indicated that about 66% of the Police Department was
White, 23% was Black, 9% was Hispanic, and 2% was Other. CITY OF BOSTON, 2015
WORKFORCE REPORT 16 (2015), https://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/
2015.04.14%20Final%20Draft-UPDATED_City%20of%20Boston%20Workforce%20
Profile%20Report_tcm3-50873.pdf [https://perma.cc/66PG-UCH7].
239. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
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The number of repeat FIO reports per subject is concentrated
among a small number of individuals who experience large numbers
of FIO encounters.240 Table 2 shows that about two FIO subjects in
three (67.5%) experienced one FIO.241 As a group, they accounted
for 24.6% of the total number of FIO reports from 2007–2010.242
About one in twenty (5.2%) experienced ten or more FIOs and, as a
group, accounted for 40.2% of the total number of FIO reports made
by BPD officers during this time.243
Table 2. FIO Report Distribution by Unique Subjects
N
Subjects

%
Subjects

Cum. %
Subjects

Sum FIOs

% FIOs

Cum. %
FIOs

51+
25–50
10–24
5–9
2–4
1 only

211
671
2,933
4,926
14,860
49,018

0.3
0.9
4
6.8
20.5
67.5

0.3
1.2
5.2
12
32.5
100

14,886
22,314
42,787
31,798
38,528
49,018

7.5
11.2
21.5
15.9
19.3
24.6

7.5
18.7
40.2
56.1
75.4
100

Total

72,619

100

100

199,331

100

100

N of FIOs

FIO forms also report the badge numbers of the BPD officers who
filled out the reports.244 Officer badge numbers were available for
N=200,103 FIO reports (97.7% of 204,739).245 BPD personnel records
240. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7, 7 tbl. 2; Boston Police Commissioner
Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note
229; Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency and
Accountability of Policing Activities to the Public, supra note 234.
241. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
242. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
243. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; Boston Police Commissioner Announces
Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note 229 (noting that
“5% of the individuals FIO’ed account for more than 40% of the total FIO reports”);

Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency and Accountability
of Policing Activities to the Public, supra note 234.
244. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra
note 229, at 7 (copy of a FIO report); see also BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 323: FIELD

INTERACTION/OBSERVATION/ENCOUNTER REPORT (FIOE REPORT) (2015),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/56a2569205caa7ee9f
29e6a2/1453479570208/rule323.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CZ-MXTA].
245. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
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identified 2359 unique officers in its workforce between 2007 and
2010, including new hires and retirements during that time period.246
Personnel records were used to determine officer demographic
information, years on the job, rank, assignment, and detective status
for all sworn BPD officers. Badge numbers on FIO reports were used
to identify the N=1,750 unique BPD officers.

N of
FIOs

Table 3. FIO Report Distribution by Unique BPD Officers
% Cum. %
% Cum. %
N
Sum
Officers
FIOs
FIO
Officers Officers
FIO

1,000+
500 - 999
250 - 499
100 - 249
50 - 99
1 - 49
Zero

28
65
128
253
214
1,062
609

1.2
2.8
5.4
10.7
9.1
45
25.8

1.2
4
9.4
20.1
29.2
74.2
100

42,399
44,153
44,809
39,693
15,179
13,870
0

21.2
22.1
22.4
19.8
7.6
6.9
0

21.2
43.3
65.7
85.5
93.1
100
100

Total

2,359

100

100

200,103

100

100

About three officers in four (74.2% of 2359) made one or more
FIO reports between 2007 and 2010.247 The counts ranged from 1 to
2315 FIOs.248 Officers averaged 84.3 FIOs over the four years, or 21
per year.249 Table 3 shows that, similar to the distribution of repeat
FIOs among subjects, the number of repeat FIO reports per officer is
also highly concentrated among a small number of individuals (Table
3).250 Nearly half (45.0%) generated fewer than 50 FIO reports and,
as a group, accounted for 6.9% of the total number of FIO reports
during the study time period.251
A small group (4.0%, or
approximately 70 officers) generated 500 or more FIOs; they
246. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
247. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
248. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
249. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
250. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
251. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.

POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE DEPARTMENT
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accounted for 43.3% of the total number of FIO reports made by
BPD officers from 2007 to 2010.252
B. Race, Crime, and FIO’s

1. FIOs by Neighborhood Crime and Social Conditions
Table 4 shows the results of the estimates of FIO activity using
alternate benchmarks for racial composition. The monthly number of
total Index crimes (logged, lagged) in a tract was a consistently
significant positive predictor of the monthly count of FIO reports in a
tract across models with varying benchmarks. This suggests that the
intensity of BPD FIO activity in a tract is associated with the amount
of serious crime experienced in a tract controlling for other
conditions. An increase of 1% more total index crime incidents in the
previous month leads to an increase of 10.6% (IRR=1.106) FIO
reports in the following month. This is a large effect, considering that
the average Boston census tract experiences 12.2 index crimes per
month. Each of the models in Table 4 show that the Boston police
prioritized crime problems in the allocation of FIO activity by tract
and police district during this period.

252. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
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Table 4. Negative Binomial Regressions of Monthly FIO Report Counts
Controlling for Census Tract Characteristics, Crime, Police Activity, and
Other Conditions for Three Racial Benchmarks (IRR, SE, p)
Residents
Arrestees
Crime Suspects
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Percent Asian / other
Percent Unknown Race
Total Crime
(logged, lagged)
Disadvantage Index

1.022 (.006) **
1.041 (.008)**
1.020 (.012)
----

1.025 (.005) **
1.016 (.008) *
0.917 (.052)
----

1.029 (.009) **
1.040 (.011) **
0.967 (.063)
0.922 (.015) **

1.106 (.026) **

1.125 (.036) **

1.091 (.027) **

0.894 (.157)

0.911 (.178)

0.924 (.143)

1.017 (.007) *

1.019 (.009) *

+

Percent Foreign Born

1.016 (.009)

Patrol Strength

1.006 (.006)

1.002 (.005)

1.006 (.006)

Moran’s I (lagged)

1.285 (.369)

1.124 (.280)

1.054 (.282)

Constant

0.063 (.052) **

0.168 (.131) *

0.916 (.035) **

District Fixed Effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Fixed Effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Season Fixed Effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Standard Errors
Clustered by Tract?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

8,303

8,303

8,303

Groups

173

173

173

Wald Chi-Square

460.36

492.63

582.82

Wald degrees of
freedom

25

25

26

Wald Chi-Square p

.000

.000

.000

Notes: Estimates reported as Incident Rate Ratios. Robust standard errors were clustered
by census tract. Percent White is the reference category for the resident, arrestee, and
suspect race dummy variables. The natural log of the total number of residents, total
number of arrestees, and total number of suspects for each tract-month were used as
exposure offsets in the respective regression models.
Significance: + p<= .10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

After controlling for crime, Table 4 also shows that the racial
composition variables for percent Black and percent Hispanic are
positive and significant for all three models. The pattern of race
effects suggests evidence of disparate treatment in FIO activity based
on neighborhood racial composition. After controlling for local crime
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rates, we observe higher rates of FIO activity for census tracts based
on their Black or Hispanic racial composition, whether in residents,
arrestees, or the race of known crime suspects. In each of these
specifications, the percentage of Foreign Born Residents in a tract
was also a statistically-significant predictor of increased FIO activity.
Since foreign born residents of Boston are primarily persons of color,
the focus of FIO activity in those neighborhoods reinforces the notion
of disparate treatment by race and ethnicity.
The consistent size and direction of the race and ethnicity
coefficients suggests a robust race effect controlling for crime, police
activity, and other relevant factors, even if they were modest in size.
Still, even modest effects can have practical significance. The disparity
in the monthly count of FIO reports can be meaningful in census
tracts with larger shares of minority residents, arrestees, and reported
suspects. Using the residential racial composition variable as an
example, the incidence rate ratio on percent Black suggests that a
one-unit increase in the Black percentage of residents relative to the
White percentage of residents in a Census tract is associated with a
2.2% increase (IRR=1.022) in the monthly count of FIO reports made
by the BPD controlling for crime and other factors. The effects of
race (and foreign born residents) in Table 4 were observed after
controlling for the number of officers deployed in each police district,
a measure of the exposure of local residents to police and their
availability for FIO contacts.
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Figure 2. Predicted Counts of FIO’s per Month by Percent Black and
Hispanic Residents in Tract, 2007–2010, Controlling for Crime &
Social Conditions

Figure 2 shows the marginal increase in the predicted count of
monthly FIO reports in a census tract as the percentages of Black and
Hispanic residents in a tract increase. The figure shows the nearly
linear and monotonic increase in the adjusted (for predictors)
monthly count of FIO reports increases as the percentages of
minority residents increases in a tract. Simply to illustrate, Figure 2
shows that a tract with 85% Black residents would experience an
additional 53 FIO reports per month compared to a tract with 15%
Black residents.253 Over the course of one year, residents in that tract

253. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 9–10; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. The trend of hyperpolicing of majority Black neighborhoods can be observed in other cities as well. See,
e.g., AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3 (2015),
http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QS3H-38KF] (“Stop and frisk is disproportionately concentrated in
the black community. Black Chicagoans were subjected to 72% of all stops, yet
constitute just 32% of the city’s population.”); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP &
FRISK DURING THE BLOOMBERG ADMINISTRATION:
2002–2013 1 (2014),
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/stopandfrisk_briefer_2002-2013_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3KU-EV5A] (“In 70 out of 76 precincts, black and Latino New
Yorkers accounted for more than 50% of stops, and in 32 precincts they accounted
for more than 90% of stops. In six of the 10 precincts with the lowest black and
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would be subjected to an additional 636 FIO reports and, over the
four-year study time period, this difference would represent an
additional 2544 FIO reports in that tract.254
Because crime and racial composition are unevenly distributed
across tracts and neighborhoods in Boston, similar to other cities, we
tested for the possible leverage of outliers in the estimates in Table
4.255 That is, both of the central findings in Table 4 on crime and race
could reflect the undue leverage and influence of neighborhood
outliers in each of these distributions.256 For example, Figure 2 shows
the concentration of crimes and race in particular corners of the city.
To test for the effects of outliers, we conducted a sensitivity test by
trimming 20% of tracts at the extremes of the FIO activity
distributions.
The results were largely unchanged.
Using a
population benchmark (Model 1 in Table 4), the IRR for percent
Black population decline from 1.022 to 1.018 in the narrower model.
For crime, the IRR of crime on FIO counts dropped from 1.106 to
1.088. In other words, the FIO / race / crime relationship is robust to
the removal of the extremes.

2. FIO Activity by Suspect Characteristics
FIOs are a first-stage intrusion by police on individual liberty and
privacy. But in Boston, the use of non-contact FIOs carries a lower
level of intrusion. While privacy may be violated in the sense that
one’s movements in these contacts are recorded by a police officer
acting on behalf of the state, a non-contact incident does not have the
same physical intrusion nor temporary detention and liberty
implications of a full contact stop.257 To compare race effects on
contact versus non-contact encounters, we estimated negative
binomial regressions of subject race and other individual
characteristics on FIO counts. The models were estimated with and
without gang membership status and arrest history to examine how

Latino populations (such as the 6th Precinct in Greenwich Village), blacks and
Latinos accounted for about 70% or more of stops.”).
254. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 9–10; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.
255. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 10; Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial
Structure, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, supra note 24, at 1766–68.
256. For an example of an estimation of leverage effects of outliers, see Richard A.
Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déja Vu All Over
Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 320–24 (2005) (showing the undue
influence of Texas in state-year fixed effects estimates of the deterrent effects of
executions on homicides).
257. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 11.
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individual criminality might mediate any observed race effects.
Model 1 in Table 5 shows the results for all FIO encounters. Model 2
controls for arrest history and gang membership, an adjustment that
acknowledges the more intense surveillance and contact rates with
suspected gang members or persons suspected by the police to be
involved in criminal activity. Model 3 re-estimates Model 2 for only
non-contact FIO encounters.
Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by
Individual Suspect Characteristics Controlling for Gang Membership (IRR, SE, p)

Black Suspect
Hispanic Suspect
Asian / Other Suspect
Unknown Race
Age
Female Suspect
Gang Member
Arrest History
Constant
District Fixed Effects?
Year Fixed Effects?
Season Fixed Effects?
SE’s Clustered by Tract?
Observations
Log Pseudo-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square
Wald Chi-Square p

All FIO Reports
Model 1
Model 2

Non-Contact
FIO Reports
Model 3

1.725 (.026) **
1.136 (.026) **
0.725 (.024) **
0.501 (.007) **
0.990 (.001) **
0.670 (.011) **
------2.788 (.058) **
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
72,619
-153,503.52
9,269.43
0.000

1.047 (.010) **
0.972 (.012) *
0.757 (.021) **
0.483 (.007) **
0.979 (.001) **
0.811 (.008) **
4.171 (.075) **
1.151 (.001) **
2.091 (.029) **
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
72,619
-117,323.91
19,112.43
0.000

1.088 (.011) **
0.969 (.013) *
0.791 (.021) **
0.681 (.007) **
0.988 (.001) **
0.830 (.009) **
3.339 (.076) **
1.108 (.001) **
2.103 (.029) **
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
72,619
-133,092.42
22,813.61
0.000

Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by tract. Race variables contrasted with
White.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

In Model 1, Black and Hispanic suspects have significantly higher
FIO activity compared to Whites.258 The effect size for Blacks is
especially large and more modest for Hispanic suspects.259 For Asian

258. See supra Table 5.
259. See id.
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and Other Race suspects, they are less likely to be the subject of an
FIO encounter compared to Whites, and the results also are
significant.260 Older suspects and females are less likely to be subjects
of FIO encounters.261
Comparing Models 1 and 2, prior arrest history and gang
membership each mediate the influence of race on the number of FIO
encounters experienced by subjects, reducing the size of the race
estimates but they remain statistically significant.262 Model 1 shows
that compared to White subjects, Black subjects experienced 72.5%
more FIO encounters per month across the city and Hispanic subjects
experienced 13.6% more FIO encounters.263 When the prior arrest
and gang status covariates are included, in Model 2, Black subjects
experienced only 8.8% more FIO encounters per month and Hispanic
subjects experienced 3.1% fewer FIO encounters compared to their
White counterparts.264 The results for Asians and Other or Unknown
race suspects remains unchanged.265 Gangs evidently are a priority in
using FIO authority, and account for at least some of the racial
disparity in FIO encounters.
The pattern for non-contact FIO activity in Model 3 is similar to
the pattern shown in Model 2.266 The effects of gang membership
increase from Model 2 to Model 3, suggesting even greater attention
to gang members, albeit without contact or interpersonal
interaction.267 This makes sense, since gang members or reputed gang
members are well known to the specialized Youth Violence Strike
Force (YVSF, informally known as the gang unit), and their
observations can be recorded for surveillance and intelligence
purposes.268 Perhaps observing gang member movements and
associations has intelligence payoffs, which might explain and
rationalize the use of police powers in this way. Since there is a
privacy but not liberty interest at stake in these non-contact
encounters, there is little regulatory leverage in this practice.

260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Allison Manning, Boston Police Data Shows Black Men Were Stopped Most
Often, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.boston.com/news/localnews/2016/01/19/boston-police-data-shows-black-men-were-stopped-most-often
[https://perma.cc/J6KR-UZN8].
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The importance of Table 5 is the finding suggesting intense police
attention to gang members by the Boston police. Gangs are thought
to be an important source of the city’s gun violence problem, which
leads to this attention, and gang membership also is skewed by both
individual and neighborhood racial composition.269

3. Frisks and Searches by Suspect Race
Table 6 shows that Black and Hispanic suspects were more likely to
be frisked or searched during an FIO encounter, after controlling for
non-racial suspect characteristics.270 Compared to White suspects,
Black suspects were 12.4% more likely to be frisked / searched, and
Hispanic subjects were 4.5% more likely to be frisked / searched
during FIO encounters with arrest and gang status covariates included
in the model.271 Gang members were 11.7% more likely to be frisked
/ searched during FIO encounters relative to their non-gang
counterparts, controlling for other factors.272 For every additional
arrest in their history, suspects were 1.8% more likely to be frisked or
searched during FIO encounters.273 Asian and other race subjects
were significantly less likely to be frisked / searched during FIO
encounters when compared to White subjects.274 Here, the gang
effect that explained FIO activity in Table 5 seems to have
comparable and independent influence on the decision to frisk as
does the suspect’s race.

269. See Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau & Andrew V. Papachristos,
Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of Boston’s
Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
113, 118 (2013) [hereinafter Deterring Gang Gun Violence]; Andrew V. Papachristos,
David M. Hureau & Anthony A. Braga, The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of
Geography and Social Networks on Gang Violence, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 417, 426, 438
(2013) [hereinafter The Corner and the Crew]; Anthony A. Braga, David Hureau &
Christopher Winship, Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches and the Resurgence of
Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141, 154 (2008) [hereinafter Losing
Faith?].
270. See infra Table 6.
271. See infra Table 6.
272. See infra Table 6.
273. See infra Table 6.
274. See infra Table 6.
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Table 6. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating Impact of
Suspect Race on Probability of a Frisk and/or Search
(OR, SE, p)
Characteristic
OR
SE
p
Age
Female
Suspect Race–Black
Suspect Race–Hispanic
Suspect Race–Asian/Other
Suspect Race–Unknown
Gang Member
Arrest History
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald Chi-square
p(Wald Chi-square)

0.977
(.001)
0.347
(.007)
1.124
(.018)
1.045
(.018)
0.837
(.021)
0.588
(.018)
1.117
(.017)
1.018
(.001)
0.459
(.082)
199,331
-121413.72
2603.82
0.000

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
***

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by tract. Fixed effects for police
districts, year and season. Random effects for tract characteristics (not
shown) include tract population (logged), total violent crime in tract (logged,
lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I. Race variables contrasted with
White suspects.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

Taken together, Tables 5 and 6 show troubling racial disparities in
the number of repeated FIO contacts and the probability of being
frisked / searched experienced by Black and Hispanic suspects.275
The effects in these tables are adjusted for the influences of age, gang
membership, neighborhood and other relevant non-race influences.
In fact, we see the frisk estimates in Table 6 as conservative and
expected to see even greater effects by suspect race considering the
attention to gangs in this setting and BPD’s use of FIOs for
intelligence gathering purposes, especially among gang members.
Other Terry stop “programs” do not document non-contact
observations, in line with the Supreme Court dicta limiting
constitutional regulation to the physical aspect of investigative
stops.276 The large FIO differences in counts of encounters—both

275. See supra Table 5; see supra Table 6.
276. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Slobogin, supra note
44, at 22–23.
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observational and face-to-face—compared to the incidence of frisks
or searches suggests more extensive use of FIO reports to monitor
gang members at a distance rather than repeatedly initiating physical
contact to search them for weapons, drugs, or other contraband.277
Perhaps this is a safety consideration, or it may be that there are
information yields from non-contact encounters, such as
understanding gang membership and associations, that can address
tactical and policy goals. Whatever the purpose and rational, more
research is needed on the reasons and circumstances for this
component of the FIO strategy, as well as its informational payoff.

4. FIO Activity by Unit and Officer Race
Table 7 shows the effects of officer characteristics on FIO
patterns.278 There were large differences in FIO activity by officer
race or ethnicity. Black officers made 42.5% fewer FIO reports per
month compared to White officers, controlling for age, sex, rank,
detective status, and assignment.279
Asian officers also made
significantly fewer FIO reports.280 Relative to White officers, Asian
officers made 44.8% fewer FIO reports, controlling for officer
demographic, rank, and assignment covariates.281 Hispanic officers
made slightly smaller numbers of FIO reports than their White
officers but the observed differences were not statistically
significant.282 Controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors,
older officers and female officers made significantly fewer FIO
reports relative to their younger and male counterparts,
respectively.283

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra Table 6.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 7.
See infra Table 7.
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Table 7. Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regressions of
FIO Counts on Officer Characteristics (IRR, SE, p)

Characteristic

IRR

SE

p

Years on Job
Female

0.902
0.377

(.007)
(.069)

**
**

0.575
0.901
0.552

(.066)
(.156)
(.121)

**

0.885
0.893
0.778

(.187)
(.151)
(.133)

*

1.021
1.131
11.953
0.358
0.215
206.322

(.583)
(9.263)
(2.655)
(.112)
(.069)
(49.72)

**
**
**
**

4.946

(.404)

**

4.592
(.389)
-4.734
(.301)
2,359
-9,833.14
1059.06
0.000

**
**

Officer Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian

**

Officer Rank
Detective
Sergeant or Lt.
Captain or Command

Officer Unit
Mobile Operations
Drug Control
YVSF
Other Patrol
Other Investigation
Constant

Zero Inflation Parameters
Administrative
Assignment
On Leave
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald Chi-square
p (Chi-square)

Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered due to
mobility of officers. Fixed effects for police district, year, season, and
police district.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

Unit assignment also was a significant predictor of officers’ FIO
activity. BPD officers assigned to the YVSF make almost 12 times as
many FIO reports per month compared to officers assigned to other
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specialized units or policing districts, controlling for other factors.284
Their mission explains in part this emphasis: YVSF officers are
charged with preventing outbreaks of gang violence.285 Completing
FIO reports on gang member whereabouts, their associations, and
routine activities represent a central activity in pursuing that mission
by massing information on the routine activities of gang members.286
Compared to line level patrol officers, Captains, Deputy
Superintendents, and Superintendents make significantly fewer FIO
reports holding other officer characteristics constant.287 These highranking officers have extensive managerial responsibilities and, while
they maintain a presence in the community, they are much less likely
to be engaging in street-level law enforcement work.288
The heavy influence of the YVSF officers on FIO activity, coupled
with the race-specific patterns shown in Table 7, leads to a further
question: whether FIO activity within the YVSF command also varies
by officer race. Table 8 shows the results of regressions with only
officers having one or more FIO encounters, and disaggregating
officers by race and YVSF assignment.289 The six groups shown in
Model 2 in Table 8 are compared to Asian and Other Race officers, a
move that exploits the fact that there are so few Asian officers in the
YVSF.290 This permits direct comparisons of the regression estimates
in Model 2.

284. See supra Table 7.
285. See Manning, supra note 268.
286. Id.
287. See supra Table 7.
288. See supra Table 7. The model used for the estimates in Table 7 is a zeroinflated negative binomial regression, which is employed in situations where there are
large numbers of observations of zero events in the data and there are separate
functions to determine any participation and then frequency of participation. See e.g.,
Kelvin K.W. Yau, Kui Wang & Andy H. Lee, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Mixed Regression Modeling of Over-Dispersed Count Data with Extra Zeros, 45
BIOMETRICAL J. 437 (2003). This regression first estimates factors that explain when
there are one or more events, and then explains the count of those events given one
or more. The first stage analyzes the inflation factors associated with any
participation. The medical leave and administrative position variables were
statistically significant predictors of zero FIO activity during the study time period,
controlling for other factors. BPD officers who were not able to perform their duties
or were assigned to administrative positions generally do not complete FIO reports.
289. See infra Table 8.
290. See infra Table 8.
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Table 8. Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by
Officer Race and YVSF Status (IRR, SE, p)
Age
Female
White Officer
Black Officer
Hispanic Officer
White YVSF
White Other
Black YVSF
Black Other
Hispanic YVSF
Hispanic Other
Constant
Observations
Log Pseudo-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square
Wald Chi-Square p

Model 1

Model 2

.916 (.006) **
.307 (.059) **
1.752 (.335) **
1.171 (.243)
1.613 (.338) *
------------------191.969 (37.743) **
1,750
-9,245.30
312.99
0.000

.922 (.006) **
.383 (.074) **
---------9.022 (2.136) **
1.488 (.287) *
8.358 (2.081) **
.826 (.170)
10.788 (3.706) **
1.112 (.265)
175.144 (34.663) **
1,750
-9,116.84
652.49
0.000

Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered due to mobility of officers.
Officers included in this analysis made at least one FIO report between 2007 and 2010. Asian is
the contrast category for the FIO officer race tests.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

Model 1 in Table 8 shows, for this narrower sample of officers, that
White and Hispanic officers had substantially more FIO encounters
than Black officers.291 Without controlling for assignment, the effect
size for White officers is more than three times the size for Black
officers; the effect size for Hispanic officers is more than three times
the size for White officers.292 Model 2 shows that this effect is an
artifact of YVSF assignment.293 Within officer race, YVSF officers
have far more frequent FIO activity than their non-YVSF
counterparts.294 The differences again are very large. White YVSF
officers have about 6.5 times more FIO encounters per month than

291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
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White officers in other units.295 The differences for Black and
Hispanic officers in the YVSF units are even greater.296
Here again, we see the importance of the YVSF unit in explaining
racial disparities in FIO encounters between citizens and police. This
is not to say that there is no evidence of racially disparate treatment
by officers in other commands; the data show that in fact, regardless
of command, White officers and Hispanic officers are more active in
FIO work.297 Rather, Table 8 shows that within this focus of police
efforts, the race disparities within officer racial categories are quite
large, and officers from all racial and ethnic groups are more active
once assigned to this command. The results suggest an institutional
dimension to explain officer FIO activity that is separate from an
individual officer’s taste or preference for discrimination.

5. Frisks and Searches by Officer Race and Assignment
Table 9 shows differences in frisk / search probability by officer
race and assignment.298 Black officers were 15.0% less likely to frisk /
search subjects during FIO encounters when compared to White
officers, controlling for age, sex, rank, detective status, and
assignment.299 Asian officers were also less likely to frisk / search
FIO subjects.300 Relative to White officers, Asian officers were 32.6%
less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters controlling
for officer demographic, rank, and assignment covariates.301 Hispanic
officers were only 4.4% less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO
encounters holding the other variables constant; that result was not
statistically significant.302 More experienced officers and female
officers were significantly less likely to frisk / search subjects during
FIO encounters relative to their younger and male counterparts,
respectively, controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors.303

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
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Table 9. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating
Impact of Officer Race on Probability of a Frisk or
Search (OR, SE, p)

Characteristic
Years on Job
Female

SE

p

0.973
0.618

(.007)
(.069)

**
**

0.850
0.956
0.674

(.066)
(.156)
(.121)

**

1.495
0.847
0.5

(.187)
(.151)
(.133)

OR

Officer Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian

**

Officer Rank
Detective
Sergeant or Lt.
Captain or Command

*

Officer Unit
YVSF
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald Chi-square
p (Chi-square)

1.243
(2.655)
315.322
(49.720)
200,103
-123,410.23
1,618.47
0.000

**
**

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by police district. Random
effects (not shown) included census tract population (logged), total
crime in tract (logged, lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I.
Fixed effects for year, season, and police district.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

Two assignments show extremely elevated rates of frisk / search
activity. Detectives were 49.5% more likely to frisk / search subjects
during FIO encounters relative to non-detectives, controlling for
assignment, rank, and other factors.304 Given their responsibility for
investigating unsolved crimes, detectives were presumably more
likely to frisk / search FIO subjects for evidence of criminal activity
during the course of an investigation. YVSF officers were 24.3%
more likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters relative to
non-YVSF officers, controlling for assignment, rank, detective status,

304. See supra Table 9.
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and other factors.305 YVSF officers focus FIO encounters on gang
members who pose a higher risk of carrying weapons relative to other
FIO subjects, which explains in part their preferences for search
relative to other BPD officers.306 Compared to line level patrol
officers, Sergeants, Lieutenants Captains, Deputy Superintendents,
and Superintendents were significantly less likely to frisk / search
subjects during FIO encounters holding other officer characteristics
constant. 307
Despite the frequent FIO activity by YVSF officers, these results
suggest that they exercise caution in proceeding from an encounter to
a frisk or search. YVSF officers were far more active in FIO activity,
by orders of magnitude, than their non-YVSF counterparts, yet only a
fraction of their encounters proceeded to a frisk or search.308
The disparity between FIO encounters by this group and frisks or
searches could suggest problems in their formation of the requisite
suspicion necessary to conduct a frisk or search contingent on a stop.
The high rate of non-frisk encounters suggests a reduced level of
reasonable suspicion in many encounters that falls below
constitutional thresholds permitting a frisk—primarily officer safety
or suspicion of weapon possession—or a search. Searches require
probable cause, a stricter standard.309 Another interpretation of this
gap could simply be that the purpose of YVSF encounters is simply to
establish contact, to signal to young males under suspicion that the
police are present and watching, and to gather intelligence. This may
be a reasoned activity in terms of policy, but it falls short of being
reasonable under constitutional requirements for even a momentary
deprivation of liberty and detention. ‘Getting it wrong’ at a high rate
suggests problems in the bases of suspicion animating a stop, a finding
with implications for constitutional regulation of FIO activity.310

6. Officer-Suspect Racial Asymmetries
The higher incidence of FIO encounters for non-White suspects
and also encounters initiated by White officers suggest the possibility

305. See supra Table 9.
306. See Manning, supra note 268.
307. See supra Table 9.
308. See supra Table 9.
309. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001) (stating that
Massachusetts follows constitutional standards in Terry v. Ohio).
310. See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding that the high rate of unproductive stops was a sign of inaccuracy in the
formation of reasonable suspicion that is a prerequisite to an investigative stop).
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of discrimination. But these results leave open the question of
statistical versus preference-based discrimination. Most studies
testing for discrimination, particularly those analyzing vehicle stops,
have relied on “hit rates” or the probability of guilt to distinguish
between these forms of discrimination. Generally, we assume an
absence of preference-based discrimination if racial differences in
police encounters are independent of the race of the police officer.311
But if there are differences in, for example, the stops of Black
suspects by White officers compared to Black officers, we might
conclude preferences for discrimination. But that evidence alone is
only a partial explanation. Those preferences might be explained by
the greater ease with which officers may be able to approach and
conduct searches of persons of their own race or ethnicity.
Alternately, if officers are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods,
then Black officers in White neighborhoods where crime rates may be
lower will conduct fewer stops of Whites. Since crime rates are higher
in predominantly Black neighborhoods in Boston and other cities, the
opposite condition would be observed: White officers would have
more encounters with Black suspects. Testing for discrimination
using these metrics therefore requires not only knowledge of officer
and suspect race, but also controls for the crime rates of the different
areas where they patrol and encounter suspects.312
Table 10a shows the results of analyses that disaggregate patterns
of FIO encounters by both officer race and suspect race four racial
groups.313 We estimated models of the count of FIO encounters using
negative binomial regressions, following the functional form used in
the previous models of FIO activity. Controls included age and
gender of the suspect and age, gender, rank and assignment for
officers. Separate models were conducted for each officer race group.
Fixed effects for police districts controlled for differential exposure of
officers to crime and to different local racial concentrations. The first
three columns compare FIO reports of each suspect racial group by

311. See generally Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of
Racial Profiling in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 127 (2006); see also Antonovics & Knight, supra note 146, at 2; Bjerk, supra

note 146, at 525.
312. This approach also discounts the problem of the “suspicious outsider,” or the
person who crosses neighborhoods of different racial composition. See Antonovics &
Knight, supra note 146, at 25. This problem may be more salient in studies of vehicle
stops where crossing of neighborhood boundaries is more common and feasible.
Here, our analysis examines pedestrian stops almost exclusively.
313. See infra Table 10a.
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officers of each race to FIO reports done by White officers.314 The
fourth column compares FIO’s by White officers to FIO reports of
Black Officers.315 The cells in Table 10a show the incidence rate ratio
for each comparison.316
Table 10a. Negative Binomial Regression Analyses of the Joint
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on FIO Counts
(IRR, SE)

Subject Race

Black

Officer Race
Hispanic Asian

Black

.645**
(.071)

.865
(.139)

.504**
(.112)

1.548*
(.169)

Hispanic

.581**
(.063)

.128
(.170)

.664
(.171)

1.722**
(.188)

Asian / Other

.616**
(.089)

1.219
(.334)

1.113
(.281)

1.623**
(.235)

White

.426**
(.041)

.731*
(.103)

.702*
(.200)

2.345**
(.227)

White

Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by police district.
Estimates control for suspect and officer age and gender. Fixed effects include
year, season, police district, and officer rank and assignment. White is the
contrast category for officer race variables in the regressions in the first three
columns of coefficients. Black is the contrast category for the White officer race
dummy variable in the regressions in the fourth column.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

To test for different discrimination patterns in frisks and searches,
we use multilevel logistic regression models as the functional form to
estimate the probability of a frisk or search across racial groups. The
results in Table 10b show the odds ratio for each comparison.317

314.
315.
316.
317.

See infra Table 10a.
See infra Table 10a.
See infra Table 10a.
See infra Table 10b.
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Table 10b. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analyses of the Joint
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on the Likelihood
of a Frisk / Search (OR, SE)

Subject Race

Black

Officer Race
Hispanic
Asian

White

Black

.813**
(.014)

.922**
(.020)

.649**
(.038)

1.229**
(.021)

Hispanic

.991
(.041)

.968
(.040)

.605**
(.068)

1.008
(.041)

Asian / Other

.949
(.060)

1.031
(.071)

.724*
(.112)

1.052
(.066)

White

.874**
(.032)

.926*
(.035)

.811**
(.057)

1.143**
(.042)

Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by police district.
Estimates control for suspect and officer age and gender. Fixed effects include
year, season, police district, and officer rank and assignment. White is the
contrast category for officer race variables in the regressions in the first three
columns of coefficients. Black is the contrast category for the White officer race
dummy variable in the regressions in the fourth column.
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01

Table 10a shows higher FIO activity for White officers for suspects
of all races, including White suspects, compared to Black officers.318
White officers have significantly more encounters with White suspects
than they have with suspects of other races.319 On the surface, this
suggests greater FIO activity compared to Black officers across all
suspect race groups, but not preferences for stops of one racial group
over others. Column 1 shows that Black officers, compared to White
officers, are significantly less active across all suspect race groups,
again suggesting discrimination other than preference-based.320
However, comparing within-suspect race results across rows,
suggests preferences for discrimination by White officers. FIO
activity Column 4 in Table 10a shows that White officers have about
318. See supra Table 10a.
319. See supra Table 10a.
320. See supra Table 10a.
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55% more FIO encounters per month with Black suspects compared
to Black officers.321 Black officers have 35% fewer stops per month of
Black suspects compared to White officers.322 This between-officer
within-suspect comparison suggest preferences by White officers
compared to Black officers in FIO activity for Black suspects. Similar
differences are evident between Black and White officers in stops of
Hispanic suspects, Asian suspects, and White suspects.323
The pattern for frisks and searches in Table 10b is similar. White
officers are more likely to frisk or search both Black and White
suspects compared to cross-racial frisks or searches by Black
officers.324 Black officers again show lower rates of frisks and
searches compared to White officers, and are equally likely to frisk or
search both White and Black suspects.325 White officers are 23%
more likely to frisk or search a Black suspect, but Black officers are
19% less likely to search Black suspects compared to White
officers.326 Hispanic officers are less likely compared to White
officers to frisk Black and White suspects, while White officers are
more likely than Hispanic officers to frisk or search both Black and
White suspects.327
One way to understand Table 10a is that while White officers may
not discriminate between suspects of different races, they do have
stronger preferences for stops between races than Black officers. This
is evident for suspects of all races. This presents a more complex
picture of the preference-statistical discrimination distinction than
previous studies have reported. White officers are more active than
are Black or Hispanic officers in FIO activity overall, but they also
prefer within each separate race to conduct FIOs relative to Black
officers. There may not be preferences by race, but there does appear
to be stronger preferences for FIO activity overall. Put another way,
White officers are biased toward everyone compared to Black,
Hispanic or Asian officers.
Given the higher rates of FIO encounters by YVSF officers, we
tested to see if the results in Tables 10a and 10b would be robust to
the exclusion of those officers. The results led to the same
conclusions, with only minor changes in the regression coefficients

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra Table 10a.
See supra Table 10a.
See supra Table 10a.
See supra Table 10b.
See supra Table 10b.
See supra Table 10b.
See supra Table 10b.
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and standard errors once the YVSF officer were excluded. We
observed the same mixed pattern of statistical and preference-based
discrimination that analyses with the full sample produced. In other
words, any preferences that we observed were not limited to that
active command.
CONCLUSION
Two features of Boston’s practices of investigative stops distinguish
it from the “new policing” regimes in other large cities. First, Boston
focuses a significant portion of its field investigation activity on
suspected and actual gang members. Boston police have pursued this
targeted strategy within its FIO activity for quite some time.328 This is
consistent with the elevated rates of crime, especially youth crime, in
the neighborhoods with the highest concentration of gang
members.329 In contrast, New York City’s investigative stop program
only recently reoriented from widespread investigative stops to a
more spatially concentrated effort focused on gang activity in public
housing sites.330 Second, the Boston Terry stop design includes both
contact encounters and non-contact observations of suspects.
Intelligence and surveillance may not be unusual in other cities, but
rarely is there formal recording of observations that do not convert
into contact encounters. Boston is distinctive in recording those
observations in the same database as its contact encounters.
The records of these encounters provided a basis to assess the
claims of discrimination that have infected the contemporary practice
of Terry stops or investigative stops as practiced in the “new
policing.” We conducted analyses to assess the allocation of officers
and FIO activity by neighborhood and suspect race, using metrics and
methods that were cited in recent litigation on other investigative stop
328. See generally DAVID KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUS., REDUCING GUN
VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE SERIES RESEARCH
REPORT 2 (2001).
329. See Deterring Gang Gun Violence, supra note 269, at 2; The Corner and the
Crew, supra note 269, at 422; Losing Faith?, supra note 269, at 146–47.
330. Richard Aborn, Crime Commission Statement on NYPD’s Operation Crew
Cut, CITIZENS CRIME COMM’N N.Y.C. (Oct. 2, 2012), www.nycrimecommission.org/
pdfs/ccc-10-02-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/56QZ-TVFD] (“Operation Crew Cut is a
smart and proactive approach to curtail youth violence which accounts for 30% of
shootings in New York City. By utilizing the latest technology, doubling the size of
the gang violence unit and coordinating closely with District Attorneys, the New
York City Police Department is making effective use of targeted resources to not
only combat crime, but create an overall deterrent effect. This is the kind of smart
solution which keeps our crime rate low, and continues to set New York apart as one
of the safest large cities in the world.”).
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programs.331 Both crime and race contribute to variations over time
and place in FIO activity. The regressions are estimated so that
effects of each are mutually adjusted. The results are robust to the
exclusion of the specialized and very active YVSF gang unit,
suggesting a generalized pattern of preferences for encounters with
Black and Hispanic suspects. We expect a rational allocation of
police activity to match variation in times and places with local crime
rates, and we observe that to be the case. But we also observe a
marginal effect of racial composition in census tracts, suggesting
statistical discrimination in those areas.
The evidence suggests a complex answer to the question of
whether that discrimination is evidence of bias. Using a racial
mismatch model, we find that White officers were consistently more
active than Black or Hispanic officers in conducting FIO reports,
regardless of suspect race. But within suspect race, the preference of
White officers to FIO Black suspects is far greater than Black officers’
preference to FIO Black or Hispanic suspects. And Black officers are
less likely to FIO a White suspect than is a White officer. These
patterns are robust to the exclusion of YVSF officers, which suggests
that the results also are robust to the exclusion of gang members.
Is this evidence of bias, or preference-based discrimination? The
data are not well suited to answer this question. We defined
statistical discrimination as a rational decision to focus efforts on one
group or to exclude another group from engagements of any sort.
Following Gary Becker’s notion of discrimination, officers who
stopped Black or Hispanic suspects more often perceived a net
benefit in the form of increased attention to crime detection.332 As a
matter of efficiency, attention to populations with a lower probability
of return would sacrifice the returns in crime control from allocating
attention to the presumed higher rate group. Becker also identifies
discrimination based on tastes or values, where the decision maker
discounts known facts.333 In the case of FIO activity, decision makers
may inflate crime propensity beyond its true value, leading to a
subjectively rational but still preference-based form of discrimination.
In our study, the marginal rate of FIOs by census tract based on racial
331. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See
generally IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, A

STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT (OCT. 2008); Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and
Frisk Practices, Mahiri Bailey et al. v City of Philadelphia, C.A., No. 10-5952,
(E.D.Pa. 2015).
332. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 197 (1971).
333. See id. at 16.
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composition after controlling for local crime rates may reflect that
type of process. It suggests that subjective evaluations of the returns
from a FIO encounter may be inflated based on race-based
distortions of information.
Kenneth Arrow described this process as “positive valuation” of
one group with higher expected return, even if that valuation is
inflated.334 Arrow describes sources of “cheap information” that
might help a decision maker to identify a discrimination target a low
cost: skin color, poor neighborhoods, or other substitutes for crime.335
These sources of cheap information may also prime decision
makers—police officers, in this case—to increase their valuation of
the suspect’s behavior. Since there is no cost for a wrong decision,
there are only weak incentives to correct or update that information.
Using the officer-suspect racial mismatch metric, the results suggest
preference-based discrimination. But without additional evidence of
the outcomes of FIO encounters, or the reasonable suspicion bases
animating these events, we cannot fully explain the motivations for
FIO encounters. These encounters may be efficient, or they may
simply be a form of routine administrative searches based on actuarial
suspicion in the absence of individualized or particularized
suspicion336 or a clear expectation of arrests or seizures of weapons.337
These encounters may simply reflect an institutional bias or norm
based on a closed system of information that reinforces command
staff and individual officers’ prior beliefs about whom to observe or
engage, setting aside questions of fairness or efficiency. FIOs here
may be based on location, peer network, or other actuarial markers
that substitute for individual markers of suspicion, raising Fourth
Amendment concerns. Explaining how those factors translate into

334. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN
LABOR MARKETS 4 (Orley Achenfelder & Albert Reiss eds., 1973).
335. See id.
336. See Eve Bresinke Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 287 (2011) (defining administrative search exceptions to Fourth
Amendment regulation to justify airport searches, subway backpack searches,
employer drug testing, and vehicle checkpoints).
337. See Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary
Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 293, 295 (2006) (citing the
U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Edmond v City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. 37, 44
(2000), stating that “[w]e cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and
ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any giver
motorist has committed some crime”).
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perceptions, decisions, attributions or behaviors requires different
research designs.338
Still, evidence of officer race disparities suggests that there is more
than just statistical discrimination or institutional preference at work
here. That these stops disproportionately target minority suspects in
non-White neighborhoods beyond what local crime rates predict,
raises Equal Protection concerns that seem to be collateral
consequences of the “new policing.”

338. Several studies have used research designs that vary race and use a variety of
cues to assess how race consciously or subconsciously affects decision making by legal
actors. These studies differ from the officer-suspect mismatch paradigm in that they
examine specific cues that influence officers’ perceptions and permit bias to infect
decisions from shooting at suspects to the construction of pre-sentence probation
reports for trial courts. Many are laboratory experiments, which strengthens their
internal validity but to some extent at the cost of external validity considerations of
context and multiple causation. Others exploit natural variation in legal settings to
discern the influence of race on decision making, increasing their external validity but
at some unknown cost to internal validity and measurement equivalence on race. In
most but not all cases, these studies show evidence of bias toward African-American
suspects or defendants. See generally, e.g., Modupe Akinola & Wendy Berry
Mendes, Stress-Induced Cortisol Facilitates Threat-Related Decision Making among
Police Officers, 126 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 167 (2012); George S. Bridges & Sara
Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional
Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554 (1998); Joshua Correll
et al., Stereotypic Vision: How Stereotypes Disambiguate Visual Stimuli, 108 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (2015); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s
Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8 SOC. &
PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 201 (2014); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking

Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts CapitalSentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006); Sandra Graham & Brian S.
Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004); Alpert, Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision
Making during Citizen Stops, supra note 98.

